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Reviving the Role of Discourse in the 
Regulation of Employee Collective 
Action 
Jeffrey M. Hirsch∗ 
The problems facing individuals who attempt to act together are 
considerable. Yet in perhaps no other area are these collective-action 
problems more acute than the workplace. This reality creates a serious 
issue for labor law, which guarantees employees the right to engage in 
collective action. Conditions in the modern workplace increasingly erect 
barriers to employees’ ability to act together which threaten this right. 
Rather than knocking down these barriers, however, labor law over the 
last several decades has reinforced them. A key factor in this failure is the 
refusal of the courts and the National Labor Relations Board to recognize 
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the substantial role that discourse plays in promoting employee collective 
action. Relying on public choice theory, game theory, and psychological 
research, this Article demonstrates the importance of employee discourse 
and shows that labor law has not given it the respect that it is due. Indeed, 
although employee discourse should be a major player in today’s most 
high-profile labor law debates — including the discussions surrounding 
the Employee Free Choice Act and employees’ right to use e-mail and the 
Internet at work — to date, it is largely absent from these discussions. 
Accordingly, this Article argues that employee discourse must be given far 
more consideration and protection, as the failure to do so will undermine 
even the most ambitious labor reforms’ ability to expand employee 
collective action.  
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INTRODUCTION 
The right to employee collective action is at the core of labor law.1 
Before employees can exercise that right, however, they must 
overcome numerous problems that interfere with their ability to act 
together. Among the most serious of these collective-action problems 
are the restrictions on employee discourse, particularly the restrictions 
on employees’ ability to access and discuss relevant information. 
Despite the significance of these problems, labor law has largely 
ignored the role of employee discourse in promoting collective action. 
If that core right is to have meaning, this failure must be rectified. 
Many of the most pressing issues in labor law — such as unions’ 
access to employer property, employees’ right to use employer-
provided e-mail, and employees’ ability to choose a representative — 
center on attempts to restrict employee discourse. Although discourse 
has a major influence on employees’ ability to act collectively in these 
instances, courts, agencies, and policymakers rarely mention it, and 
even when these decisionmakers acknowledge discourse, they badly 
undervalue its significance.2 Correcting that error requires a new 
conception and appreciation of discourse’s role in fostering employee 
collective action. This Article attempts to promote such reform by 
providing a thorough account of discourse’s importance to labor law 
— an account that has been conspicuously absent to date.3 
Discourse — the act of people communicating with each other — is 
a central component of social interaction. Social interaction, in turn, is 
a necessary condition for groups to form and act collectively. Thus, 
without discourse there is no group action. All forms of discourse are 
not sufficient to prompt such action, however. It takes repeated 
interactions to establish the trust and feelings of shared interests that 
 
 1 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2006) (defining employees’ right to act collectively under 
National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA”)). “Labor law” typically refers to the regulation 
of collective action, as opposed to “employment law,” which generally focuses on 
individual employment issues.  
 2 See infra Parts III.A.2-3. 
 3 ELLEN DANNIN, TAKING BACK THE WORKERS’ LAW 43-44 (2006) (arguing that 
NLRB should rely more on social science research); Catherine L. Fisk & Deborah C. 
Malamud, The NLRB in Administrative Law Exile: Problems with Its Structure and 
Function and Suggestions for Reform, 58 DUKE L.J. 2013, 2078-79 (2009) (same). This 
absence speaks primarily to labor rules or decisions; other commentators have raised 
related themes before. See, e.g., Mark Barenberg, Democracy and Domination in the Law 
of Workplace Cooperation: From Bureaucratic to Flexible Production, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 
753 (1994) (proposing to encourage employee free choice and workplace voice by 
restricting employer distortions of employee deliberations). 
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individuals require first to identify themselves as a group and, 
ultimately, act as one.4 
Despite the importance of discourse to collective action, labor law 
has continually dismissed the need for substantial employee 
communications.5 In case after case, the courts or federal labor 
agencies — particularly the National Labor Relations Board (“NLRB” 
or “Board”) — acknowledge that discourse has a role in collective 
action, but give protection for such a limited amount that they might 
as well not have bothered. Under this prevailing view, labor law need 
only prevent employers from barring all forms of communication to 
satisfy employees’ right to collective action; courts have deemed even a 
mere theoretical opportunity to communicate sufficient.6 That view, 
however, is demonstrably untrue. As public choice theory, game 
theory, and psychological research show, collective action requires a 
significant level of discourse and information transference among 
individuals; mere sporadic or impersonal contacts are inadequate. 
Thus, to fulfill the rights embodied in the National Labor Relations 
Act (“NLRA”)7 and other labor laws, there must be far more protection 
for employees’ ability to communicate — protection for not only the 
frequency of communications but also the type. In short, if employees 
are to enjoy their statutory right to collective action, there must be a 
major revival in the appreciation and protection for workplace 
discourse. 
As Part I of this Article illustrates, discourse plays a necessary and 
vital role in overcoming various collective-action problems. In Part II, 
the Article extends this analysis to the workplace and argues that 
current labor law fails to protect employee discourse to the extent 
needed to guarantee employees’ right to act collectively. Finally, in 
Part III, the Article explains how to implement a revived employee 
discourse doctrine using several current labor law issues as examples. 
 
 4 This Article will hereafter use “discourse” to describe the type of substantive 
interactions that can lead to collective action, as opposed to more basic 
communications. 
 5 This idea may also apply to employees’ communications with employers, unions, 
and other third parties. See infra notes 132-35, 219-21 and accompanying text. 
 6 Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB, 502 U.S. 527, 540-41 (1992); Guard Publ’g Co. 
(Register-Guard), 351 N.L.R.B. 1110, 1114 (2007), enforced in part, enforcement denied 
in part, 571 F.3d 53 (D.C. Cir. 2009). 
 7 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-69 (2006). 
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I. THE ROLE OF DISCOURSE IN OVERCOMING COLLECTIVE-ACTION 
PROBLEMS 
Although it may appear so at times, portraying discourse as a crucial 
component of collective action is not a new idea. Researchers have 
long studied group dynamics, and the role of discourse in creating and 
fostering groups has often been part of that research.8 The significance 
of discourse results from its role as the key means to overcome 
collective-action problems. 
As Mancur Olson described in The Logic of Collective Action, one of 
the foundational works on modern public choice theory, the ability of 
a group of individuals to act together becomes increasingly difficult as 
the group gets larger.9 Even if everyone in the group would benefit 
from coordinated action, each individual’s rational, self-interested 
choice is often to avoid acting in concert.10 One reason is that in a 
larger group the potential benefit for each individual member is small, 
making the choice to expend resources to help with the group’s goals 
less appealing.11 Additionally, all individuals in a group will typically 
enjoy any gains resulting from collective action, regardless of whether 
they contributed, which creates a further disincentive to participate in 
the group’s efforts. This “free rider” problem is a major hurdle both to 
initiating and to maintaining collective action.12 Indeed, the free rider 
problem means that even groups that act collectively will typically do 
so at a suboptimal level.13 
 
 8 See, e.g., RALPH H. TURNER & LEWIS M. KILLIAN, COLLECTIVE BEHAVIOR 21 (1957) 
(“Unless there is a minimum of cultural homogeneity and a certain ‘we’-feeling in a 
collectivity, there will not be a sufficient basis for the communication between 
individuals which is necessary for the development of collective action.”); Leon 
Festinger, Informal Communications in Small Groups, in GROUPS, LEADERSHIP AND MEN 
28, 35-38 (Harold Guetzkow ed., 1951). 
 9 MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE 
THEORY OF GROUPS 2, 11-12 (1965). 
 10 Id. at 34-36 (noting that individuals who get significant benefits from group 
action may incur costs of action themselves, which is more likely in smaller groups). 
However, as Elinor Ostrom and others have explained, social norms can lead 
individuals to act collectively despite what appears to be their rational, self-interested 
choice. See Elinor Ostrom, Collective Action and the Evolution of Social Norms, 14 J. 
ECON. PERSP. 137, 140-41 (2000). That said, Olson’s arguments still point to highly 
relevant hurdles to collective-action, if not absolute bars. 
 11 OLSON, supra note 9, at 49-52; see also Herbert Hovenkamp, The Limits of 
Preference-Based Legal Policy, 89 NW. U. L. REV. 4, 60 (1994) (noting also that reverse 
is true for small groups). 
 12 Barenberg, supra note 3, at 933. 
 13 OLSON, supra note 9, at 28-31, 34-36 (defining optimal level of collective good 
existing where marginal benefit equals marginal costs, which occurs when each 
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However, it is at the initial stages of collective action that the free 
rider problem, as well as others, is most severe. When individuals first 
attempt to act together there are significant start-up costs, such as 
creating an organization to control the effort, and the benefits, if any, 
will initially be low.14 During this initial phase, it also can be difficult 
for the group to reach an agreement about what type of action to take 
and how to coordinate that effort once the group makes its decision.15 
Moreover, as Olson observed, smaller groups tend to be more 
productive because they are more homogeneous and better able to 
coordinate group action even beyond the group’s formative period.16 
In both small and large groups, however, one common feature of 
starting, organizing, and coordinating collective action is that they 
require group members to communicate with each other.17 Thus, as 
the cost of communication increases, a group’s ability to act 
decreases.18 
The classic game theory problem, the prisoner’s dilemma, illustrates 
the importance of discourse in overcoming barriers to collective 
action. In the most basic prisoner’s dilemma game, two players who 
have been arrested for committing a crime together face the option of 
either exposing the other’s involvement or staying quiet.19 If both 
players stay quiet, they would receive lower punishments than if they 
both exposed the other. However, if one stays quiet and the other 
talks, the player who talked goes free, and the player who stayed quiet 
faces severe punishment. The result in a single round of the game is 
usually that each player, worried about the other failing to stay quiet, 
 
member of group shares equally marginal costs and benefits — likelihood that 
decreases as group size increases). 
 14 Id. at 22, 30-31. 
 15 Id. 
 16 Id. (noting also that larger groups generally need more agreement, coordination, 
and organization); see also Philip P. Frickey, From the Big Sleep to the Big Heat: The 
Revival of Theory in Statutory Interpretation, 77 MINN. L. REV. 241, 250-51 (1992) 
(describing groups engaging in public policy actions). 
 17 However, even with substantive communications and full information, 
individuals may not make rational decisions based on such information. Cynthia 
Estlund, Just the Facts: Towards Workplace Transparency 11 (N.Y.U. Sch. of Law Pub. 
Law & Legal Theory Research Paper Series, Working Paper No. 09-55; N.Y.U. Sch. of 
Law, Law & Econ. Research Paper Series, Working Paper No. 09-39, 2009) 
[hereinafter Towards Workplace Transparency], available at http://ssrn.com/abstract= 
1485535 (citing endowment and framing effects that result from individuals’ 
unwillingness at times to act in economically rational manner). 
 18 OLSON, supra note 9, at 46-47 (noting costs of bargaining and creating 
organizational structure). 
 19 ROBERT AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION 15-69 (1984). 
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exposes the other. The “dilemma” is that they would both have been 
better off staying quiet, but neither player has a way of ensuring that 
the other will do so.20 
The suboptimal outcome associated with the basic prisoner’s 
dilemma assumes that there is no communication among the players.21 
Yet, with communication, the players can achieve a better result.22 If 
the players can converse with each other before deciding what to do, 
they can formulate a strategy that would benefit them both — in the 
classic problem, they would each stay quiet. Even with such a strategy, 
however, the game will still be “lost” if the players do not trust each 
other to maintain their silence. Accordingly, low levels of 
communication may still be insufficient; to win the game, the players 
often will need repeated interactions to help foster trust. That trust, in 
turn, increases the likelihood that the players will engage in the 
cooperative solution of staying quiet.23 
The workplace provides a real-world example of this problem 
because employees’ decisions whether to engage in collective action 
can, at times, resemble a prisoner’s dilemma.24 For instance, where 
there is a fear of employer retaliation, most employees will be 
reluctant to put themselves at risk by initiating or openly engaging in 
collective action. However, if a large group of employees work 
together, there is a smaller chance that the employer will try to punish 
them all or be able to single out individual employees. Yet, like in the 
prisoner’s dilemma, each individual’s fear of acting alone and facing 
retaliation may prevent all employees from taking action. If the 
employees could effectively discuss their strategy and gain enough 
trust so that most of them participate, they could overcome this 
collective-action problem. Without substantial discussions, however, 
group action is unlikely to occur. 
Psychological research confirms the importance of discourse in 
overcoming barriers to collective action. Studies have repeatedly 
shown that for a group to adopt certain beliefs or decisions, group 
 
 20 Id. 
 21 Id. 
 22 Christopher R. Leslie, Trust, Distrust, and Antitrust, 82 TEX. L. REV. 515, 538 
(2004). 
 23 Id. at 538-39 (citing studies showing that trust and cooperation increases with 
communication and other factors, including Robyn M. Dawes & Richard H. Thaler, 
Anomalies: Cooperation, 2 J. ECON. PERSP. 187, 193 (1988) (“One of the most powerful 
methods for inducing cooperation in these games is to permit the subjects to talk to 
one another”)). 
 24 See infra Part II (discussing workplace collective-action problems). 
  
1098 University of California, Davis [Vol. 44:1091 
members must first consider and discuss those beliefs.25 For example, 
psychologists often characterize the process of individuals’ identifying 
themselves as members of a group, and ultimately acting in concert, as 
a type of “shared reality.” This concept describes a group of 
individuals that share a common perception of an experience or 
issue.26 A state of shared reality allows individuals to trust and to find 
a common identity with each other, eventually forming a group that 
can make decisions or act to promote shared interests.27 This idea 
mirrors Olson’s observation that groups exist to further common 
interests and that smaller groups are better able to achieve this goal28 
because it is generally harder to form a shared reality among a larger 
group of individuals. 
One of the major determinants of whether a shared reality develops 
is discourse. Communication is required for individuals to share their 
views on subjects, which in turn is a necessary aspect of forming 
relationships.29 However, this process takes time because the 
formation of interpersonal relationships usually requires frequent 
interactions to build trust and establish commonalities among 
individuals. Without a significant level of communication, it is 
unlikely that the interpersonal bonds necessary for group formation 
will develop.30 Accordingly, substantive communication — discourse 
— is the linchpin to group formation and collective action.31 
 
 25 See, e.g., DANIEL BAR-TAL, GROUP BELIEFS: A CONCEPTION FOR ANALYZING GROUP 
STRUCTURE, PROCESSES, AND BEHAVIOR 71-72 (1990) (describing importance of 
“dissemination” of group beliefs). 
 26 Gerald Echterhoff et al., Shared Reality: Experiencing Commonality With Others’ 
Inner States About the World, 4 PERSP. PSYCHOL. SCI. 496, 497-98 (2009) (defining 
“shared” broadly as “a conceptualization that emphasizes the experience of having 
common inner states regarding some aspect of the world”). There are other definitions 
of “shared reality” that are not relevant to this discussion. Id. 
 27 NEIL J. SMELSER, THEORY OF COLLECTIVE BEHAVIOR 8 (1962) (arguing that shared 
beliefs are necessary for collective action). 
 28 OLSON, supra note 9, at 7, 11-12; see also Jack M. Beermann, Interest Group 
Politics and Judicial Behavior: Macey’s Public Choice, 67 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 183, 184 
(1991) (describing how smaller groups with focused interests can more effectively 
obtain benefits through legislative process than larger groups with diffuse, or broadly 
allocated, interests). 
 29 Echterhoff et al., supra note 26, at 497-98. 
 30 Id. at 500 (citing DANIEL BAR-TAL, SHARED BELIEFS IN A SOCIETY: SOCIAL 
PSYCHOLOGICAL ANALYSIS (2000)) (noting that significant communication and 
interpersonal interactions are needed even where individuals affirmatively want to 
establish commonality). In certain situations, however, shared realities can also lead to 
“bad” group decisions. Id. at 515 (citing Robert S. Baron, So Right It’s Wrong: 
Groupthink and the Ubiquitous Nature of Polarized Group Decision-Making, in 37 
ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 219, 234-35 (M.P. Zanna ed., 2005)); 
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To be sure, individuals can form interpersonal relationships under 
many conditions including, for instance, a workplace in which an 
employer significantly limits non-job-related communications.32 
Unless there is an absolute ban of all non-job-related matters, 
employees who interact every day are likely to form some type of 
interpersonal bond.33 However, even if they can be considered a group 
in psychological terms, their ability to act on matters of common work 
interests will be significantly harmed by the communication policy. If 
employees are unable to discuss their work conditions and other 
matters of mutual concern frequently, then they will have a hard time 
determining each other’s positions on these topics. This is a 
substantial impediment to collective action for at least two reasons. 
First, many employees will have difficulty evaluating their own 
positions on these issues because solidifying one’s view of an 
especially complex or controversial issue often involves comparing 
that view to someone else’s.34 In essence, as one psychologist has 
stressed, “[k]nowledge is social.”35 Second, even if individuals have 
solidified their views, they are unlikely to act collectively without 
knowing the views of others. This is because individuals must have a 
common perception of an issue to form a shared reality.36 If 
individuals are unaware of others’ views on an issue, they will not be 
 
Garold Stasser & William Titus, Pooling Unshared Information in Group Decision 
Making: Biased Information Sampling During Discussion, 48 J. PERSON. & SOC. PSYCHOL. 
1467, 1477 (1985)). 
 31 See SMELSER, supra note 27, at 8; Donald G. Marquis et al., A Social Psychological 
Study of the Decision-Making Conference, in GROUPS, LEADERSHIP AND MEN, supra note 8, 
at 55, 64 (finding that more communication increased group productivity). 
 32 See supra Parts III.A.1, III.A.3. 
 33 Cynthia L. Estlund, Working Together: The Workplace, Civil Society, and the Law, 
89 GEO. L.J. 1, 9-10, 71 (2000) [hereinafter Working Together] (noting also that 
workplace interactions are still often subject to restraints that restrict freedom of 
communication). 
 34 Echterhoff et al., supra note 26, at 496. The lack of this “social sharing” can 
leave individuals “uncertain, uncomfortable, [and] even physically agitated.” Id. 
(citing RICHARD E. BYRD, ALONE (1938); S.E. Asch, Effects of Group Pressure Upon the 
Modification and Distortion of Judgments, in GROUPS, LEADERSHIP AND MEN, supra note 8, 
at 177, 177-90). 
 35 BAR-TAL, supra note 25, at 110 (“Knowledge is social. Much of any individual’s 
knowledge is acquired from other people and is shared by them.”); see also Festinger, 
supra note 8, at 28. 
 36 Echterhoff et al., supra note 26, at 498-99 (citing Philip Brickman, Is It Real? in 
NEW DIRECTIONS IN ATTRIBUTION RESEARCH 5, 5-34 (J.H. Harvey et al. eds., 1978)) 
(describing commonality among individuals’ “inner states”). 
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able to develop a common perspective, thereby making shared reality 
and group action impossible.37  
The benefit of discourse is not merely as a determinant in whether 
group action of any kind will occur; discourse also influences the 
amount and quality of group action. In particular, studies have shown 
that as group members share more of certain types of information, the 
group becomes more productive.38 In one study, researchers tracked a 
team of twelve airline employees who worked at a concourse of a 
major U.S. airport.39 The researchers discovered that the team had 
developed over time, as each individual learned more about other 
team members, a strong and unanimous belief about its ability to 
achieve a certain level of on-time performance, which the team was 
able to maintain despite several unforeseen obstacles.40 In contrast to 
the team’s ability to match its on-time goal, the employees had more 
difficulty meeting other performance goals that were not as strongly or 
universally held.41 Moreover, when an unexpected crisis finally 
prevented the team from meeting its on-time goal, the employees’ level 
of motivation dropped significantly.42 This study demonstrates the 
power of group beliefs: a strongly held shared view, resulting from a 
substantial level of communication, motivated all of the employees 
and resulted in improved performance for the group as a whole.43 
Absent that shared belief, the employees were less motivated, less 
confident, and less productive.44 
 
 37 DAVID HUME, A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE 538 (1952) (emphasizing that small 
groups do more because individuals are better able to know others’ views and failure 
to contribute is more easily identifiable). 
 38 Wendy P. van Ginkel & Daan van Knippenberg, Group Information Elaboration 
and Group Decision Making: The Role of Shared Task Representations, 105 
ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 82, 83 (2007). 
 39 Cristina B. Gibson & P. Christopher Earley, Collective Cognition in Action: 
Accumulation, Interaction, Examination, and Accommodation in the Development and 
Operation of Group Efficacy Beliefs in the Workplace, 32 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 438, 438-39 
(2007) (following team consisting of customer service representatives, ramp 
servicepeople, maintenance crew, cabin appearance personnel, and cargo personnel). 
 40 Id. at 439, 443-44. 
 41 Id. at 451 (citing customer service goals). 
 42 Ironically, a labor dispute caused the crisis. Id. at 450-51. 
 43 Id. at 439; see also van Ginkel & van Knippenberg, supra note 38, at 89 
(describing experiment showing that group performance increased when group 
members share task goals more). 
 44 Cf. Clyde Summers, Employee Voice and Employer Choice: A Structured Exception 
to Section 8(a)(2), 69 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 129, 135 (1993) (discussing advantages of 
Germany’s and Japan’s “shared enterprise” employment models). 
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As the airline example illustrates, the importance of discourse to 
employee collective action is particularly strong. At almost every stage 
of the collective-action process — from initially learning about an 
issue and discussing options for addressing it to formulating and 
carrying out various strategies — employees must clear hurdles that 
are as severe as those seen in virtually any group. Thus, workplace 
discourse plays a vital role in determining whether employees are able 
to act together to promote their common interests.45 
II. REGULATING DISCOURSE IN THE WORKPLACE 
The importance of discourse has long been recognized in various 
aspects of work law.46 Whether as a condition for an economically 
efficient labor market, a prerequisite for the enforcement of employees’ 
rights, or a means for opposing unlawful employment practices, 
employees’ ability to communicate and access information of various 
types has been a factor in many workplace policy debates.47 Yet in no 
area is the concern over discourse more prominent than labor law. 
Labor law’s relationship with discourse and information is unique 
among other work laws because those interests are integral to its 
fundamental concept: employees should be free to engage in collective 
action. As the text of the NLRA states, the right to collective action 
was the primary purpose of the statute: 
It is hereby declared to be the policy of the United States to . . . 
encourag[e] the practice and procedure of collective 
bargaining and [to] protect[] the exercise by workers of full 
 
 45 See Donald C. Langevoort, Taking Myths Seriously: An Essay for Lawyers, 74 
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1569, 1578 (2000) (noting that groups working toward aim must 
“communicate information to each other, identify the nature of their task, assess costs, 
benefits and potential strategies, and arrive at some consensus for action”). 
 46 In a more recent example, Professor Cynthia Estlund has explored the 
importance of information to individual employee action. Estlund, Towards Workplace 
Transparency, supra note 17 (proposing mandatory disclosure of employer’s workplace 
policies). 
 47 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2006) (prohibiting retaliation against 
employees’ opposition to conduct unlawful under Title VII’s antidiscrimination 
protections); PAUL C. WEILER, GOVERNING THE WORKPLACE: THE FUTURE OF LABOR AND 
EMPLOYMENT LAW 73-74 (1990) (discussing information asymmetries under at-will 
rule); Cass R. Sunstein, Human Behavior and the Law of Work, 87 VA. L. REV. 205, 219-
26 (2001) (discussing information asymmetries and transaction costs with regard to 
at-will employment); Christine Jolls, Employment Law 38-39 (Yale Law Sch., Pub. Law 
Working Paper No. 132, 2006), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=959453 
(discussing information effects on labor supply).  
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freedom of association, self-organization, and designation of 
representatives of their own choosing . . . .48 
From the early days of the statute, the NLRB and courts have noted 
the role of discourse and information in employees’ exercise of their 
right to association, self-organization, representation, and other forms 
of collective action.49 These decisions implicitly recognized that labor 
law’s guarantee of the right to engage in collective action necessarily 
depended on employees’ ability to communicate among themselves 
and access enough information to decide whether and how to act 
together.50  
Although recognition of discourse’s role in collective action has 
never fully vanished, over the last several decades, the NLRB and 
particularly the courts have increasingly dismissed the connection 
between the two. In case after case in which employer interests are 
weighed against employees’ right to collective action, the need for 
discourse has frequently received little more than lip service.51 This 
disregard has substantially weakened employees’ labor rights, for even 
where those rights are explicitly articulated in statutes or decisions, 
employees’ inability to converse with each other often makes those 
rights useless.52 The cruel irony is that as the NLRB and courts have 
diminished the significance of discourse in overcoming collective-
 
 48 29 U.S.C. § 151 (2006). This purpose is embodied in Section 7 of the Act, 
which states in part that “[e]mployees shall have the right to self-organization, to 
form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives 
of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of 
collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection . . . .” Id. § 157. These rights 
are enforced through Section 8(a)(1), which provides that “[i]t shall be an unfair labor 
practice for an employer (1) to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the 
exercise” of their Section 7 rights. Id. § 158(a)(1). 
 49 See, e.g., Excelsior Underwear, Inc., 156 N.L.R.B. 1236, 1240-43 (1966) 
(discussing importance of effective union communications with employees during 
NLRB-run election); infra note 106, 305 (discussing collective action to promote 
interests of nonunion employees). 
 50 Mushroom Transp. v. NLRB, 330 F.2d 683, 685 (3d Cir. 1964) (recognizing 
that “almost any concerted activity for mutual aid and protection has to start with 
some kind of communication between individuals”); see also Laurence Monnoyer-
Smith, Deliberation and Inclusion: Framing Online Public Debate to Enlarge Participation. 
A Theoretical Proposal, 5 I/S: J.L. & POL’Y FOR INFO. SOC’Y 87, 112 (2009) (discussing 
importance of deliberation and communications in group political action). 
 51 See infra Parts III.A.2-3. 
 52 Cynthia L. Estlund, Labor, Property, and Sovereignty After Lechmere, 46 STAN. L. 
REV. 305, 331-32 (1994) [hereinafter Labor, Property, and Sovereignty]. 
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action problems, changes in the workplace have made those problems 
more acute.53  
A. The Hurdles to Workplace Communications 
Most modern employees face a very different environment than 
workers in the past. For instance, job security is much lower today, 
and employees spend less time with a given employer than before.54 
This increase in job mobility makes collective action more difficult 
because it decreases both employees’ long-term interest in improving 
work conditions at a given firm and their willingness to incur the costs 
of collective action for a job they may not have for long.55 The 
workplace has also become more diverse, which is largely beneficial, 
but makes it more difficult for employees to achieve consensus.56 
Moreover, increased competition among firms, especially in the global 
economy, has fueled more employer resistance to demands for better 
work conditions.57 This resistance not only raises the risk of retaliation 
for employees who engage in collective action, but delays the possible 
benefits as well.58 
The enhanced complexity of the modern workplace also exacerbates 
a common problem for employees — a lack of relevant information. 
Information asymmetries affect many elements of employees’ work 
life, including their ability to bargain with their employers and reach 
an economically efficient agreement.59 Similarly, information 
 
 53 There may also be a broader cultural shift away from social activities. But see 
Estlund, Working Together, supra note 33, at 3-4 (arguing that workplace is among 
most important places for social interaction). See generally ROBERT D. PUTNAM, 
BOWLING ALONE: THE COLLAPSE AND REVIVAL OF AMERICAN COMMUNITY (2000) (arguing 
that Americans’ participation in social activities is decreasing). 
 54 KATHERINE V. W. STONE, FROM WIDGETS TO DIGITS: EMPLOYMENT REGULATION FOR 
THE CHANGING WORKPLACE 74-83 (2004); Tristin K. Green, Discrimination in 
Workplace Dynamics: Toward a Structural Account of Disparate Treatment Theory, 38 
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 91, 102 (2003). 
 55 Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt, The Changing Face of Collective Representation: The 
Future of Collective Bargaining, 82 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 903, 916 (2007). Employee 
mobility also makes it more difficult to maintain already existing collective-action 
efforts. Id. at 917. 
 56 Id. (referring to demographic diversity); Katherine Y. Williams & Charles A. 
O’Reilly III, Demography and Diversity in Organizations: A Review of 40 Years of 
Research, 20 RES. ORG. BEHAV. 77, 120 (1998); see OLSON, supra note 9, at 46. 
 57 Dau-Schmidt, supra note 55, at 916. 
 58 See Barenberg, supra note 3, at 933 (describing employees’ inability to enjoy 
long-term benefits of collective-action); infra notes 185-95 and accompanying text. 
 59 See supra note 47. Information asymmetry refers to differences in parties’ 
knowledge of types of relevant information, such as a firm’s financial strength. See 
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asymmetries can create significant barriers to employee collective 
action. If employees are unaware of the options or legal protections for 
acting collectively, they are unlikely even to consider such action, 
much less actually attempt it.60  
To be sure, employees who are unionized or have been part of a 
union organizing campaign will typically have some information about 
their legal protections,61 but these employees are a small portion of the 
overall workforce.62 The reality is that most employees are probably 
unaware of their right to engage in many types of collective action, 
such as sharing salary information with coworkers, much less the way 
in which they can exercise those rights.63 
 
Michael L. Wachter, Theories of the Employment Relationship: Choosing Between Norms 
and Contracts, in THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES ON WORK AND THE EMPLOYMENT 
RELATIONSHIP 163, 168 (Bruce E. Kaufman ed., 2004). 
 60 For instance, information is especially important when a group of employees 
decide whether to seek collective representation. Employees’ awareness of, and ability to 
discuss their options, are crucial factors in their ability to form a decision that accurately 
reflects the group’s preferences. See supra notes 34-36 and accompanying text. 
 61 Unions are often able to overcome the information problem because they are 
knowledgeable, repeat players. Sunstein, supra note 47, at 260. 
 62 Private-sector union density — the percentage of all nongovernmental wage and 
salaried workers who are members of a union — declined in the United States from 
35.7% in 1953 to 7.2% in 2009 (8.0% of workers in 2009 were covered by a union-
negotiated collective-bargaining agreement; no coverage data available prior to 1977). 
Barry T. Hirsch & David A. Macpherson, Union Membership and Coverage Database 
(2009), UNIONSTATS.COM (2010), http://www.unionstats.com (showing also that 
public-sector union density in 2009 was 37.4%–41.4% covered — and union density 
for all workers was 12.3%–13.6% covered); see also LEO TROY & NEIL SHEFLIN, U.S. 
UNION SOURCEBOOK: MEMBERSHIP, FINANCES, STRUCTURE, DIRECTORY A-1, A-3 (1985) 
(estimating 1953 data); Barry T. Hirsch & David A. Macpherson, Union Membership 
and Coverage Database from the Current Population Survey: Note, 56 INDUS. & LAB. REL. 
REV. 349-54 (2003) (describing method used to compile union membership data 
starting in 1978, which had private-sector union density of 21.7%). 
 63 Although employees’ knowledge of their collective rights has not been well 
studied, related findings suggest a significant information gap in employees’ awareness 
of their legal rights. RICHARD B. FREEMAN & JOEL ROGERS, WHAT WORKERS WANT 119 
(1999) (finding that 83% of employees incorrectly believed that employers cannot fire 
someone for no reason); Pauline T. Kim, Bargaining with Imperfect Information: A 
Study of Worker Perceptions of Legal Protection in an At-Will World, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 
105, 134 (1997) (finding that approximately 80% of unemployed workers erroneously 
believed employer cannot terminate employees for whistleblowing or to hire other 
employees at lower wage, and nearly 90% erroneously believed that termination could 
not be based on employer’s personal dislike of employee). Although these studies 
indicate that employees think they have more rights than they actually do, this 
misinformation could still cause problems, as employees may be too careless in how 
they engage in collective action and subject themselves to lawful terminations. More 
likely, however, is that employees make the opposite mistake regarding protections for 
collective action. Given the large number of terminations linked to union campaigns, 
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As discussed below, labor law has not only failed to take these 
collective-action problems into account, it has made them worse. 
Many labor law reforms would help reverse that trend; however, the 
most basic need is for the NLRB, courts, and other labor policymakers 
to acknowledge the important role that discourse plays in overcoming 
the hurdles to employee collective action. Such recognition would not 
be a cure-all because discourse cannot overcome all workplace 
collective-action problems, but a genuine change in perspective would 
dramatically improve employees’ ability to act together. Without such 
a change, discourse and information will remain no more than a side 
note — an aside that may enjoy the occasional passing reference, but 
does little to promote employees’ labor rights. 
B. Electronic Communications at Work 
Among the more promising answers to the lack of protection for 
discourse in the workplace are the recent, extraordinary advances in 
communication technology. The increased availability and 
affordability of the Internet, e-mail, instant messaging, and other types 
of electronic communications have transformed employees’ 
interactions with each other and their employers.64 This trend 
represents a substantial advance for workplace collective action, as the 
lower cost of communication and coordination can significantly 
enhance employees’ ability to form and act as a group.65 Electronic 
communications may also be a means for employees to avoid some of 
the significant limits the NLRB and courts have imposed on workplace 
discourse.66 
According to the Department of Labor, approximately 40% of all 
workers used the Internet or e-mail at work in 2003.67 A private survey 
 
employees may think they have few legal protections in such instances or the 
protections that do exist are inadequate. See infra note 187. 
 64 Jeffrey M. Hirsch, The Silicon Bullet: Will the Internet Kill the NLRA, 76 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 262, 274-75 (2008). 
 65 BAR-TAL, supra note 25, at 72; Dau-Schmidt, supra note 55, at 918. 
 66 See infra Part III.A. 
 67 BLS Finds 55 Percent of Employees Used Computers at Work in October 2003, 
Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 148, at D-24 (Aug. 3, 2005) [hereinafter 55 Percent of 
Employees Used Computers at Work]. Use of instant messaging in the workplace is at a 
similar level. Survey Finds More Employer Policies Focus on Employees’ E-mail than IM, 
Blogs, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 137, at A-8 (July 18, 2006) (describing survey 
finding that 35% of employees used instant messaging at work); see also AMA/EPOLICY 
INSTITUTE, 2004 WORKPLACE E-MAIL AND INSTANT MESSAGING SURVEY SUMMARY 8 
(2004), available at http://www.epolicyinstitute.com/survey/survey04.pdf (finding that 
31% of employees used instant messaging, 94% of whom at least partially for business 
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conducted a year later found that the use of e-mail at work was even 
higher, with over 80% of employees spending an hour or more e-
mailing each day.68 Although the disparity in these numbers indicates 
the challenges in measuring e-mail use, the studies reveal a substantial 
reliance on workplace electronic communications, which has almost 
certainly increased in the intervening years. Although face-to-face 
discussions remain the ideal for organizing employees,69 electronic 
communications have increasingly become a second-best substitute   
at least among employees who are frequent users of this technology. 
Because such workers are disproportionately young, the prevalence of 
workplace electronic communications will undoubtedly expand in the 
near future.70  
There are many reasons why e-mail and other electronic 
communications are becoming such an important part of employee 
collective-action efforts. Most obviously, general use of electronic 
communications has grown rapidly over the last couple of decades,71 
and it is natural to see a parallel expansion in the workplace. Many 
employees may also believe that e-mail and other types of electronic 
communications can provide a veil of privacy — albeit one that is 
illusory.72 Further, for employees with access to their co-workers’ e-
mail addresses, electronic communications provide an easy and 
effective way to distribute information to a large number of people, 
many of whom may be difficult to reach by traditional means.73 
Finally, electronic communications have been an increasingly 
important response to labor law restrictions on the use of more 
 
purposes). 
 68 AMA/EPOLICY INSTITUTE, supra note 67, at 7 (reporting that 18.5% of employees 
spent from zero to fifty-nine minutes per day on e-mail; 24.9% spent sixty to eighty-
nine minutes; 22.4% spent ninety minutes to two hours; 14.1% spent two to three 
hours; 10.3% spent three to four hours; and 9.9% spent more than four hours). 
 69 See infra notes 83-97 and accompanying text. 
 70 Dau-Schmidt, supra note 55, at 918-19. 
 71 U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, FALLING THROUGH THE NET: TOWARD DIGITAL INCLUSION 
1 (2000), available at http:// search.ntia.doc.gov/pdf/fttn00.pdf [hereinafter FALLING 
THROUGH THE NET]. 
 72 See Stored Communications Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2701(c)(1) (2006) (exempting 
employer monitoring of own electronic systems from ban on unauthorized access of 
communications); William A. Herbert, Workplace Electronic Privacy Protections 
Abroad: The Whole Wide World is Watching, 19 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 379, 384 
(2008) (arguing that United States lacks effective right of workplace privacy, 
especially compared to other countries). 
 73 For instance, electronic communications may be more useful in reaching 
salespersons, telecommuters, and other employees who do not spend a significant 
amount of time at the same worksite. 
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traditional discourse.74 However, as discussed below, the electronic 
avenue is in jeopardy of being closed off to employees as well.75 
One prominent illustration of electronic communications’ value to 
collective action is reflected in union organizing strategies. Unions 
have the resources and experience necessary to take advantage of new 
technology, as well as a strong incentive to use these tools to avoid 
legal constraints on more direct communications.76 Thus, unions were 
quick to use the Internet to provide information to members and 
potential members.77 Building on those efforts, recent organizing 
campaigns have increasingly incorporated e-mail and other electronic 
communication strategies.78 Indeed, one union literally started in an 
Internet chat room and maintained all of its business meetings via 
electronic communications.79 
Technology’s ability to enhance employee communication is 
significant but no panacea. Although helpful, electronic 
communications are not an equal substitute for face-to-face 
discussions. Personal interactions involve important social signals that 
give valuable information about the views of each participant.80 Those 
signals help the participants understand the beliefs of others and, in 
turn, help shape each participant’s own views.81 This view-shaping 
function is a precursor to the development of a group or group 
 
 74 Hirsch, supra note 64, at 263, 268-69 (describing increasing number of union 
campaigns that avoid NLRB-election process). 
 75 See infra Part III.A.3. 
 76 Richard B. Freeman, From the Webbs to the Web: The Contribution of the Internet 
to Reviving Union Fortunes 2–5, 10–11 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper 
No. 11298, 2005) (discussing unions’ use of Internet and noting high quality of 
American unions’ websites); infra Part III.A.2. 
 77 Freeman, supra note 76, at 2-5, 10-11. 
 78 See, e.g., U-Haul Co. of Cal., 347 N.L.R.B. 375, 385 (2006) (organizing drive 
started union website information); Frontier Tel. of Rochester, Inc., 344 N.L.R.B. 
1270, 1277 (2005), enforced, 181 F. App’x 85 (2d Cir. 2006) (finding unlawful 
termination of employee who created webpage to encourage employee discussions 
during union campaign). 
 79 The union is the Association of Pizza Delivery Drivers. Michelle Amber, Union 
Loses First Attempts to Organize Pizza Drivers with Votes in Ohio, Nebraska, Daily Lab. 
Rep. (BNA) No. 227, at A-7 (Nov. 26, 2004). The union later disbanded and many of 
its officers began working with the American Union of Pizza Delivery Drivers. 
Michelle Amber, Union that Organized Florida Pizza Drivers Says It Gets Inquiries from 
Other Drivers, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 186, at A-9 (Sept. 26, 2006). 
 80 See Echterhoff et al., supra note 26, at 503. 
 81 See id. at 510. 
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action.82 Electronic communications, however, are often unable to 
replicate these effects.83 
Psychological research into the “saying-is-believing” phenomenon 
reveals why face-to-face communications are superior to electronic 
ones. In a typical saying-is-believing study, a speaker describes one 
person to an audience who is familiar with the described subject.84 The 
description starts with supplied passages that can be reasonably 
interpreted as either positive or negative, after which the speaker then 
provides her own descriptions of the subject. However, the speaker is 
told whether her audience likes or dislikes the subject. In repeated 
studies of this sort, speakers do two things. First, they adjust their 
descriptions to match what they were told about their audiences’ like 
or dislike for the subject.85 Second, their own memory of the supplied 
description matches their audiences’ views of the subject.86 The latter 
effect works as follows: after delays that range from as little as ten 
minutes to as long as several weeks, researchers asked speakers to 
repeat as accurately as they could the original, supplied descriptions. 
Speakers’ memories of the ambiguous passages mirrored their 
audience-adjusted description, rather than the supplied description 
they read initially.87 This means that people not only adjust their 
 
 82 See supra notes 25-31 and accompanying text. 
 83 Paul M. Schwartz, From Victorian Secrets to Cyberspace Shaming, 76 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 1407, 1442-43 (2009) (citing ALEX PENTLAND, HONEST SIGNALS: HOW THEY SHAPE 
OUR WORLD 82-83 (2008)); see Ann E. Carlson, Recycling Norms, 89 CALIF. L. REV. 
1231, 1245 (2001) (stressing importance of personal contact in solving collective-
action problems); see also William A. Herbert, Workplace Consequences of Electronic 
Exhibitionism and Voyeurism 1 (Dec. 16, 2009) (unpublished manuscript), available 
at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1524557 (noting that electronic communication can lead 
to miscommunication and “electronic exhibitionism”). 
 84 Echterhoff et al., supra note 26, at 502-03 (describing various studies).  
 85 This is referred to as an “audience-tuned message.” Id.; Leslie R.M. Hausmann 
et al., Communication and Group Perception: Extending the “Saying is Believing” Effect, 
11 GROUP PROCESSES & INTERGROUP REL. 539, 539-40 (2008). 
 86 Hausmann et al., supra note 85, at 540; C. Douglas McCann et al., Primacy and 
Recency in Communication and Self-Persuasion: How Successive Audiences and Multiple 
Encodings Influence Subsequent Judgments, 9 SOC. COGNITION 47, 57 (1991). 
 87 This “audience-congruent memory bias” is not solely the result of knowing the 
audience’s views; rather, the speaker must actually communicate the audience-tuned 
message. Hausmann et al., supra note 85, at 540 (citing E.T. Higgins, Achieving 
“Shared Reality” in the Communication Game: A Social Action that Creates Meaning, 11 
J. LANGUAGE & SOC. PSYCHOL. 107, 144-71 (1992); E.T. Higgins & W.S. Rholes, 
“Saying is Believing”: Effects of Message Modification on Memory and Liking for the 
Person Described, 14 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 363, 376 (1978); C.D. McCann & 
E.T. Higgins, Personal and Contextual Factors in Communication: A Review of the 
“Communication Game,” in LANGUAGE, INTERACTION AND SOCIAL COGNITION 144, 144-
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message to fit an audience’s view, but also alter their own 
interpretation of a subject to mesh with the views of their audience. 
For instance, one study showed that an eyewitness’s memory of an 
event can change based on hearing another person’s retelling of the 
witnessed event.88 This saying-is-believing effect can also manifest 
itself in different situations, including where the subject is an 
individual or a small group.89 The key is that a speaker and audience 
develop some form of interpersonal connection that results in a 
merging or sharing of beliefs.90 
The saying-is-believing effect illustrates why electronic 
communications cannot duplicate the interpersonal bonds that 
accompany face-to-face communications. The dynamic in face-to-face 
communications works in two directions; both the speaker and the 
audience influence each other. This influence is particularly strong 
where the speaker and audience are already part of a group, such as 
co-workers with a certain degree of familiarity and trust.91 Electronic 
communications can replicate some of this effect but not to the same 
extent.92 Additionally, face-to-face communications are better suited 
for applying social pressure or learning social norms. Groups, 
particularly smaller ones, may develop social norms, or impose social 
costs and rewards, that can often spur collective action where it might 
not otherwise occur.93 Again, electronic communications can convey 
some of these social considerations but to a lesser degree than 
personal contact.  
 
71 (G.R. Semin & K. Fielder eds., 1992)). 
 88 See René Kopietz et al., Shared-Reality Effects on Memory: Communicating to 
Fulfill Epistemic Needs, 28 SOC. COGNITION 353, 373 (2010). 
 89 Hausmann et al., supra note 85, at 549-50 (finding saying-is-believing effect 
when communicating with or about small group). 
 90 Echterhoff et al., supra note 26, at 503. 
 91 Id. at 504 (citing and describing various studies); Gerald Echterhoff et al., 
Audience-Tuning Effects on Memory: The Role of Audience Status in Sharing Reality, 40 
SOC. PSYCHOL. 150, 152 (2009) (finding that saying-is-believing effect is stronger 
between speaker and audience of equal status). 
 92 See Iris Bohnet & Bruno S. Frey, The Sound of Silence in Prisoner’s Dilemma and 
Dictator Games, 38 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 43, 43-44 (1999) (finding that cooperation 
is much greater in face-to-face public-good games than in anonymous ones, including 
games in which players cannot communicate); Ostrom, supra note 10, at 140-41 
(noting that players in game theory experiments cooperate less when communicating 
through computers rather than in person); cf. Jesse Dill, Listen to Your State: Resolving 
the Nonemployee Union Representative Access Debate through State Property Law, 12 
TENN. J. BUS. L. 129, 141-42 (2010) (describing superiority of face-to-face 
communications in increasing voter turnout in political elections). 
 93 See OLSON, supra note 9, at 61-62; Ostrom, supra note 10, at 140-41, 154. 
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This research’s impact on labor law is two-fold. First, although 
electronic communications are an increasingly valuable category of 
employee discourse, they still have significant shortcomings compared 
to face-to-face communications. Second, this psychological research 
demonstrates the inaccuracy of the prevailing view that any single 
form of communication, no matter how impersonal, is sufficient to 
provide opportunities for employees to act together.94 Collective 
action often requires a substantial level of interaction among 
individuals, and while electronic communications can be an important 
part of that dynamic, they will rarely be sufficient. 
In addition to the inherent shortcomings of electronic 
communications, their use, although ubiquitous in some workplaces, 
is rare or nonexistent in many others. The “digital divide” that has 
kept many low-income people from enjoying access to electronic 
communications is also seen in the workplace, particularly with blue-
collar and service jobs.95 Moreover, even in workplaces dependent 
upon electronic communications, employees are often prohibited from 
using them to further their collective interests. In particular, the most 
common means for employees to communicate electronically involves 
the use of employer-owned computers or Internet service. As 
discussed in detail below,96 this has created a tension between 
employees’ ability to communicate and employers’ desire to limit use 
of their property. Indeed, as of 2005, at least 76% of employers 
currently had some type of policy restricting employees’ use of e-mail 
at work.97 
Labor law is particularly well suited to govern the balance between 
these competing interests. Yet, for years the NLRB failed even to 
acknowledge that electronic communications might warrant a new 
approach to its regulation of workplace discourse.98 Once it finally 
addressed the question, it maddeningly rejected the mere notion that 
 
 94 See infra Part III.A.2. 
 95 FALLING THROUGH THE NET, supra note 71, at 98, 110. 
 96 See infra Part III.A.3. 
 97 55 Percent of Employees Used Computers at Work, supra note 67, at D-24 (noting 
also that 31% of those employers regulate instant messaging and 9% regulate 
blogging). 
 98 See Martin H. Malin & Henry H. Perritt, Jr., The National Labor Relations Act in 
Cyberspace: Union Organizing in Electronic Workplaces, 49 U. KAN. L. REV. 1, 3-4 
(2000); Elena N. Broder, Note, (Net)workers’ Rights: The NLRA and Employee 
Electronic Communications, 105 YALE L.J. 1639, 1655 (1996); Miles Macik, Note, 
“You’ve Got Mail.” A Look at the Application of the Solicitation and Distribution Rules of 
the National Labor Relations Board to the Use of E-mail in Union Organization Drives, 78 
U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 591, 604-05 (2001). 
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electronic communications present any unique issues. Indeed, one of 
the more frustrating aspects of the NLRB’s regulation of discourse in 
general is that it consistently has failed to account for changes in the 
workplace, whether they involve e-mail and other advances in 
communications, different physical workspaces, or employees’ 
evolving job duties.99 These changes often create additional barriers to 
collective action, which makes the Board’s restrictions on the rare 
innovations that actually enhance employee discourse all the more 
troubling. 
Despite these new challenges, the NLRB and courts have been far 
more concerned with protecting employers’ property concerns than 
promoting employees’ ability to discuss matters of common interest. If 
employees’ right to collective action is to have any meaning in the 
modern workplace, that approach must change. 
III. REVIVING WORKPLACE DISCOURSE 
Employees’ ability to communicate and access relevant information 
implicates a large number of labor law issues. This breadth reveals the 
importance of employee discourse, but also makes reform attempts 
more complex. There is no magic bullet, no simple statutory 
amendment that will fully rejuvenate labor law’s acknowledgement of 
discourse as a necessary element of collective action. Instead, reviving 
the role of discourse requires an approach as varied as the issues it 
touches. Some of those issues would benefit from statutory reform, 
while others need only an adjustment of agency and judicial mindsets. 
What follows, then, are discussions of some of the more high-profile 
labor issues involving employee discourse and recommendations to 
strengthen its role in these debates. These examples are just that — 
illustrations that can serve as a template for expanding protection of 
employee discourse more generally throughout labor law. 
A. Employer Restrictions on Workplace Discourse 
One issue that has arisen repeatedly under labor law is the tension 
between employers’ property interests and employees’ labor rights, 
especially the right to communicate. Like most employment laws and 
regulations, the right of employee discourse necessarily infringes on 
employers’ control of their workplaces.100 The NLRB and courts have 
 
 99 See supra note 54. 
 100 For example, prohibitions against discriminatory hiring conflicts with 
employers’ control of access to their property. O. Lee Reed, Nationbuilding 101: 
Reductionism in Property, Liberty, and Corporate Governance, 36 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 
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long struggled to resolve that tension, and they frequently do so in 
ways that reveal a fundamental lack of appreciation for discourse’s role 
in promoting collective action. 
The basic problem with the jurisprudence in this area is that it often 
considers the mere possibility of contact as sufficient to satisfy 
employees’ right to communicate, with little consideration for whether 
that contact provides a realistic opportunity for collective action. This 
view ignores the fact that the right to communicate exists only as a 
means to promote the right to collective action.101 Over the last few 
decades, this decoupling has become more pronounced, and it appears 
unlikely that the NLRB or courts will reverse that trend in the near 
future. Thus, congressional action may be the only genuine hope for 
achieving a more appropriate balance between employer property 
interests and employee discourse. 
1. Employee-Only Communications 
Initial attempts to balance employer and employee interests were 
relatively sympathetic to the importance of discourse. Some of the 
earliest cases under the NLRA concerned employer attempts to 
prohibit employees from communicating with each other at the 
workplace, setting up a conflict between employers’ right to control 
use of their property and employees’ right to act collectively.102 The 
Supreme Court ultimately addressed this conflict in Republic Aviation 
v. NLRB, where it approved a Board rule permitting only limited 
restrictions on employees’ workplace discourse.103 
Republic Aviation involved several consolidated cases in which 
employers applied no-solicitation rules against employees who were 
trying to communicate with co-workers about unionization.104 In its 
decision, the Court rejected an extreme property rights argument, 
emphasizing that all rights, including employers’ property rights, have 
limits.105 Those limits become especially salient when property 
interests are used to justify intrusions into employees’ labor rights, as 
was the case in Republic Aviation. 
 
673, 719 (2003). 
 101 See supra note 50. 
 102 See, e.g., Peyton Packing Co., 49 N.L.R.B. 828 (1943) (establishing rule 
governing employers’ ability to restrict protected employee speech at workplace). 
 103 See Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793, 801 (1945), enforcing 
LeTourneau Co., 54 N.L.R.B. 1253, 1262 (1944). 
 104 See id. at 795-97. 
 105 Id. at 798, 802 n.8. 
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The Court recognized discourse’s role in promoting collective 
action, approving the NLRB’s view that the workplace was “uniquely 
appropriate” for employee discussions and that limits on these 
discussions were in “clear derogation” of employees’ labor rights.106 
This recognition of the connection between discourse and collective 
action was critical, as it was the key rationale for limiting employers’ 
control over their property.107 However, as described below, this tie 
ultimately unraveled when the Court addressed union organizers’ and 
other nonemployees’ attempts to communicate.108 
In balancing workplace discourse against employers’ property 
interests, the Court in Republic Aviation approved the NLRB’s rule that 
restrictions on employee communications in work areas, during work 
time, were presumptively valid, while restrictions that applied in 
nonwork areas or on nonwork time were not.109 Employers could 
rebut this presumption by showing a special business justification for 
further limits.110 Future cases complicated this rule by, among other 
things, giving employers more leeway to restrict written 
communications,111 but the Republic Aviation framework has 
traditionally struck an appropriate balance between employer property 
interests and employee discourse. Although the rule, which does not 
relate well to situations involving electronic communications or more 
flexible work schedules and work areas, has shown its age as the 
workplace has evolved, it remains an all-too-rare example of a labor 
rule that adequately respects employee discourse.112 
Although modernizing the Republic Aviation analysis by ending the 
largely anachronistic distinction between oral and written 
communications and adjusting the concepts of “work time” and “work 
area” would make it more effective in the modern workplace, its basic 
 
 106 Id. at 801 n.6 (“[T]he employees, working long hours . . . , were entirely 
deprived of their normal right to ‘full freedom of association’ in the plant on their own 
time, the very time and place uniquely appropriate and almost solely available to them 
therefor. The [employer’s] rule is therefore in clear derogation of the [organizational] 
rights of its employees guaranteed by the Act.”); accord NLRB v. Magnavox Corp., 415 
U.S. 322, 325 (1974); Estlund, Working Together, supra note 33, at 9-11 (describing 
importance of workplace to discourse). 
 107 See 324 U.S. at 802 n.8. 
 108 See infra Part III.A.2. 
 109 324 U.S. at 803 n.10 (quoting Peyton Packing Co., 49 N.L.R.B. 828, 843-44 
(1943)); see also TeleTech Holdings, Inc., 333 N.L.R.B. 402, 403 (2001) (“A no-
distribution rule which is not restricted to working time and to work areas is overly 
broad and presumptively unlawful.”).  
 110 324 U.S. at 803 n.10; see also TeleTech Holdings, 333 N.L.R.B. at 403. 
 111 See infra note 155. 
 112 See infra note 155. 
  
1114 University of California, Davis [Vol. 44:1091 
structure is still sound.113 Indeed, Republic Aviation has proved so 
workable that it should serve as the basis for other communication 
analyses. As explained below, the NLRB and courts have strayed from 
this analysis when regulating communications involving 
nonemployees or new technology, resulting in a diminution of 
employees’ ability to act collectively.114 A return to Republic Aviation in 
these situations would strengthen employees’ labor rights, while still 
protecting employers’ valid business interests. 
2. Employee-Nonemployee Communications 
In addition to the intra-employee discussions addressed in Republic 
Aviation, the other major source of positive information about 
collective action is a union organizer.115 However, the Supreme Court 
has long refused to extend to outsiders the protections that employee 
speakers enjoy, relying instead on a rule that looks more to a 
communication’s source than its effect on employees’ rights.116 The 
Court’s motivation was an exaggerated concern for employer property 
interests, which led it to a rule that exists only through a severe 
discounting of discourse’s role in promoting collective action. 
In Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB, the Court rejected the NLRB’s attempt to 
balance employer and employee interests when union organizers try to 
access the workplace.117 The Court insisted that such a balance is 
rarely needed and held that employers should be allowed to bar 
nonemployees from communicating with workers in virtually all 
instances.118 The key to this holding was the Court’s lack of respect for 
the importance of discourse.  
The Court in Lechmere made a firm distinction between the 
importance of employee and nonemployee communications.119 Under 
Republic Aviation, employees have a direct right to communicate 
 
 113 324 U.S. at 803 n.10; see also TeleTech Holdings, 333 N.L.R.B. at 403. 
 114 See infra Parts III.A.2, III.A.3. 
 115 William B. Gould, Union Organizational Rights and the Concept of “Quasi-Public“ 
Property, 49 MINN. L. REV. 505, 512-13 (1965) (describing importance of union-
employee contact at workplace). 
 116 See NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 351 U.S. 105, 112 (1956). 
 117 Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB, 502 U.S. 527, 538 (1992) (rejecting NLRB’s balancing 
rule in Jean Country, 291 N.L.R.B. 11, 14 (1988)). 
 118 Id. at 537-38, 540 (holding that “[i]t is only where access is infeasible that it 
becomes necessary and proper to . . . balanc[e] the employees’ and employers’ 
rights”). 
 119 Id. at 533, 541. 
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because it is a core feature of collective action.120 However, according 
to the Court, nonemployees only have a “derivative” right to 
communicate with employees.121 A nonemployees’ right is considered 
derivative because it exists only as a means of assisting employees in 
their decision whether to act collectively.122 Accordingly, under 
Lechmere, an employer can exclude all nonemployees from its 
workplace as long as it does not discriminate against union messages 
and the nonemployees have some alternate means to contact 
employees.123 
Even accepting this analysis,124 public choice theory and 
psychological research do not support the weight that the Court gives 
to the employee-nonemployee distinction. As evidenced by its 
begrudging acknowledgement of the need for communication between 
employees and nonemployees,125 the Court in Lechmere failed to 
comprehend the immense hurdles to employees’ learning about 
collective action. As a result, the derivative “right” is often worthless. 
The Court’s lack of respect for workplace discourse is highlighted by 
its alternate access exception.126 Under this exception, a nonemployee 
must be allowed some use of employer property where there are no 
“reasonable alternatives” to communicating with employees.127 
“Reasonable alternatives” could have many meanings, but the Court 
and NLRB have so narrowed the exception that it is effectively 
nonexistent. Aside from the rare case involving something like an off-
shore oil rig or a remote logging camp, any opportunity to contact 
workers — no matter how difficult, expensive, or ineffective — is 
 
 120 Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793, 801-02 (1945). 
 121 502 U.S. at 533, 540 (citing Babcock & Wilcox, 351 U.S. at 113). 
 122 Id. at 532 (“[The right to] self-organization depends in some measure on the 
ability of employees to learn the advantages of self-organization from others.”). 
 123 Id. at 535, 538; infra notes 127-29 and accompanying text. 
 124 Commentators have widely criticized the derivate rights analysis by noting, for 
example, that the NLRA speaks to “employees” generally, not merely to employees of 
the specific employer involved. R. Wayne Estes & Adam M. Porter, Babcock/Lechmere 
Revisited: Derivative Nature of Union Organizers’ Right of Access to Employers’ Property 
Should Impact Judicial Evaluation of Alternatives, 48 SMU L. REV. 349, 354-56 & n.3 
(1995); Alan L. Zmija, Union Organizing After Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB — A Time To 
Reexamine the Rule of Babcock v. Wilcox, 12 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 65, 101 (1994); 
see also Jeffrey M. Hirsch, Taking State Property Rights Out of Federal Labor Law, 47 
B.C. L. REV. 891, 901-04 (2006) (noting other problems with Lechmere analysis). 
 125 Lechmere, 502 U.S. at 539-41. 
 126 Id. at 533. 
 127 Id. at 537. The other general exception exists where the employer prohibits use 
of its real property in a discriminatory fashion. Id; see also infra note 156.  
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deemed “reasonable.”128 Thus, even indirect contact, such as 
advertisements in a large metropolitan area, is considered a reasonable 
alternative to accessing employees at work.129 The rationale, to 
paraphrase the Court, is that the NLRA merely requires some contact 
with employees, not effective contact.130 However, this rule conflicts 
with the Act’s goal of protecting employees’ ability to make informed 
decisions about collective action.131 
As Professor Cynthia Estlund, among others, has noted, not all types 
of communication are equal.132 Newspaper advertisements, websites, 
and mailed materials typically provide only a limited amount of useful 
information. More importantly, these media lack any interpersonal 
contact, which is a critical factor in individuals’ ability to act 
together.133 The Court, therefore, was wrong to hold that passive 
transfers of information satisfy employees’ right to learn about 
collective action.134 If employees are to make an informed choice about 
acting collectively, they need to engage in true bilateral discussions 
that involve meaningful opportunities to present information and ask 
questions, especially given the significant risks and uncertainties 
involved.135 
The facts of Lechmere aptly show the divergence between reality and 
what the Court considers to be adequate communication. The union 
in Lechmere argued for application of the reasonable alternatives 
exception because the organizing took place in a large metropolitan 
 
 128 Lechmere, 502 U.S. at 540-41 (citation omitted) (holding that employer may 
exclude nonemployee organizers from its premises unless organizers can “establish 
the existence of any ‘unique obstacles’ that frustrated access to . . . employees”); 
Nabors Ak. Drilling, Inc. v. NLRB, 190 F.3d 1008, 1014 (9th Cir. 1999). 
 129 502 U.S. at 540. 
 130 Id. at 539 (quoting NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 351 U.S. 105, 113 (1956)) 
(“[The exception] does not apply wherever nontrespassory access to employees may 
be cumbersome or less-than-ideally effective, but only where ‘the location of a plant 
and the living quarters of the employees place the employees beyond the reach of 
reasonable union efforts to communicate with them.’ ”). 
 131 See sources cited supra note 50. 
 132 Estlund, Labor, Property, and Sovereignty, supra note 52, at 331-32 (arguing that 
Lechmere ignores fact that workplace communications are necessary to effective 
organizing); see also Estes & Porter, supra note 124, at 363-66; Zmija, supra note 124, 
at 101, 113-16. 
 133 See BAR-TAL, supra note 25, at 71-72; Festinger, supra note 8, at 30 (stressing 
importance of physical proximity and face-to-face communications); supra Part I. 
 134 Lechmere, 502 U.S. at 537-38 (emphasizing that “direct contact, of course, is not 
a necessary element of ‘reasonably effective’ communication; signs or advertising also 
may suffice”). 
 135 See supra Part III.A (discussing risk of employer retaliation and information 
gaps that exist in organizing campaigns). 
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area, where reaching employees through mass media would be both 
expensive and ineffective.136 Moreover, according to the union, using 
the strip of public property near the worksite would be unsafe because 
of the adjacent high-speed traffic.137 The Court rejected the union’s 
arguments, holding that those facts did not make the employees 
“inaccessible” for two reasons: because “direct contact, of course, is 
not a necessary element of ‘reasonably effective’ communication” and 
because, in any event, the union had been able to contact “a 
substantial percentage of them directly, via mailings, phone calls, and 
home visits.”138 
It defies belief that using signs and advertising in a large 
metropolitan area is a “reasonably effective” means to inform a specific 
group of employees about unionization and foster the level of 
discourse needed for them to act together. Indirect contact is typically 
unable to promote collective action in the best of circumstances, much 
less where it involves costly advertising that has little chance of 
reaching its target audience in a useful manner.139 Further, the direct 
contacts in Lechmere — home visits and mailings that occurred only as 
a result of the now-illegal practice of obtaining employees’ names and 
addresses through their license plates140 — did not allow employees to 
communicate among themselves, which is a crucial aspect of group 
action. Indeed, as evidence of the inferiority of these modes of 
communication, the “substantial percentage” of direct contacts in 
Lechmere involved only 20% of the employees and, not surprisingly, 
resulted in only one signed authorization card.141 In short, the Court’s 
unjustifiably restrictive definition of reasonable contact has eliminated 
in most instances any realistic opportunity for useful employee-
nonemployee discourse. 
This limitation on discourse interferes not only with nonemployee-
instigated collective action, but also with group action that employees 
initiate. By allowing employers to bar all but the most superficial of 
 
 136 Lechmere, 502 U.S. at 540.  
 137 See id. at 533, 540 (rejecting NLRB’s agreement with union’s argument). 
 138 Id. 
 139 See supra notes 92-93 and accompanying text. 
 140 Following Lechmere, Congress prohibited obtaining employee information from 
license plates in most instances under the Federal Driver’s Privacy Protection Act of 
1994. 18 U.S.C. § 2724(a) (2006); see also Pichler v. UNITE, 542 F.3d 380, 384, 396 
(3d Cir. 2008) (affirming approximately $5 million award against union for obtaining 
home addresses from employee license plates). 
 141 Lechmere, 502 U.S. at 530 (noting that union was able to get names and 
addresses of 41 of 200 employees, whom they contacted through four mailings, in 
addition to some phone calls and home visits). 
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outside contact, the Court has undermined employees’ ability to 
confront issues in their workplace. Even in situations where 
employees would benefit from collective action, they may not be able 
to act without input from an individual with perceived authority on 
the topic.142 This is because group members, before agreeing to a joint 
decision, frequently rely on an authority figure to consider and 
support the decision.143 Although some employees may be able to 
fulfill that role, it is often well-informed, professional union organizers 
who are most capable of acting as the voice of authority.144 But 
organizers’ effectiveness in fostering group decision-making strongly 
depends upon their ability to converse with employees in a meaningful 
way.145 By holding that the NLRA protects only the most rudimentary 
access to employees, rather than success at organizing them,146 the 
Court has virtually guaranteed that, in most workplaces, access will 
never equal success.147 This conflicts with the NLRA’s guarantee that 
employees have the right to advance their interests as a group because 
without input from outsiders, collective action may never have a 
chance to occur. 
Prior to Lechmere, the NLRB attempted to address this concern by 
balancing employers’ property interests against the need for 
nonemployee discourse in a given situation.148 Because the Court is 
unlikely to reconsider its rejection of that balancing test, the solution 
is up to Congress. Reviving the NLRB’s balancing test or applying 
some form of the Republic Aviation analysis could permit substantive 
communications between employees and nonemployees, while still 
 
 142 BAR-TAL, supra note 25, at 71-72. 
 143 Id. 
 144 See generally Lechmere, 502 U.S. at 540-41 (recognizing that access to union 
organizers is important part of employees’ ability to learn about and possibly exercise 
their right to self-organization). 
 145 BAR-TAL, supra note 25, at 72 (describing influence on group members as 
depending on status and strength of those imparting information, immediacy — in 
terms of space and number of contacts — with group members, and number of 
sources of information); Ostrom, supra note 10, at 149. 
 146 Lechmere, 502 U.S. at 540-41. 
 147 Id. at 543 (White, J., dissenting) (“Moreover, the Court in Babcock recognized 
that actual communication with nonemployee organizers, not mere notice that an 
organizing campaign exists, is necessary to vindicate § 7 rights. If employees are 
entitled to learn from others the advantages of self-organization, it is singularly 
unpersuasive to suggest that the union has sufficient access for this purpose by being 
able to hold up signs from a public grassy strip adjacent to the highway leading to the 
parking lot.”); Anne Marie Lofaso, Persistence of Union Repression in an Era of 
Recognition, 62 ME. L. REV. 199, 214-16 (2010). 
 148 Jean Country, 291 N.L.R.B. 11, 14 (1988). 
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respecting employers’ valid business interests. Either of these reforms 
would allow the NLRB to recognize constructive discourse as an 
indispensable component of collective action. Leaving Lechmere 
undisturbed, however, guarantees that for many employees, the NLRA 
is but an empty promise. 
3. Electronic Communications 
One of the biggest ironies of the current approach to workplace 
discourse is that when a new form of communication developed that 
was both effective and seemed to avoid the restrictions of Lechmere, 
the NLRB squelched it. E-mail and other electronic communications 
represented one of the few options that, while not as effective as 
interpersonal discourse, still provided a viable avenue for discussing 
matters of mutual interest. Additionally, electronic communications’ 
use of employers’ personal — rather than real — property, diminishes 
the conflict between property rights and labor rights.149 In sum, 
electronic communications seemed to be one of the few effective 
means that unions could employ to interact with employees in a post-
Lechmere world.150 But in a recent case, Register-Guard, the NLRB 
rejected that assumption and more. In yet another instance of 
employer interests trumping employees’ labor rights, the NLRB 
concluded that employers could bar electronic communications under 
basically the same conditions as Lechmere.151 More significantly, this 
rule applied not only to nonemployees but to employees’ electronic 
communications as well. 
In Register-Guard, the NLRB addressed an employer’s policy 
prohibiting use of a firm’s communication equipment for nonbusiness 
solicitations.152 Despite this policy, the employer had frequently 
 
 149 E-mail and other types of electronic communications systems are personal 
property — a type of chattel — which is entitled to significantly less protection 
against trespass than real property. Intel Corp. v. Hamidi, 71 P.3d 296, 302-03 (Cal. 
2003) (noting that trespass of chattel, unlike real property trespass, requires proof of 
harm). 
 150 Hirsch, supra note 64, at 273-76. 
 151 Lofaso, supra note 147, at 217. 
 152 The policy stated: 
Company communication systems and the equipment used to operate the 
communication system are owned and provided by the Company to assist in 
conducting the business of The Register-Guard. Communications systems 
are not to be used to solicit or proselytize for commercial ventures, religious 
or political causes, outside organizations, or other non-job-related 
solicitations. 
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allowed personal e-mails on its equipment.153 However, the employer 
ultimately enforced the policy against an employee, the local union 
president, who had sent three union-related e-mails to employees’ 
work accounts.154 The discipline appeared to be a straightforward 
Republic Aviation issue of an employee communicating with other 
employees, but the NLRB had a much different perspective.155 
In reviewing the administrative law judge’s determination that the 
policy was lawful but the discipline of the union president was not,156 
the NLRB called for an extraordinarily rare oral argument and invited 
amicus briefs, giving hope that it would thoroughly consider the 
multitude of issues that electronic communications implicate.157 
Instead, the Board reflexively sided with employer property interests, 
even though such a decision required it to ignore well-established 
property and labor law. 
The NLRB’s central conclusion was that, “[c]onsistent with a long 
line of cases governing employee use of employer-owned equipment, 
we find that the employees here had no statutory right to use the 
 
Guard Publ’g Co., 351 N.L.R.B. 1110, 1111 (2007), enforced in part, enforcement denied 
in part, 571 F.3d 53 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (holding that policy applied only to solicitations, 
not informational or proselytizing messages). 
 153 Id.  
 154 Id. Two e-mails were sent from union computers and one e-mail was sent from 
a work computer. Id. at 1112. 
 155 E-mail does raise potential complications under Republic Aviation, specifically 
whether e-mail should be treated as an oral solicitation or a written distribution and 
whether to apply the traditional work time/work area exception. TeleTech Holdings, 
Inc., 333 N.L.R.B. 402, 403 (2001) (allowing employers to bar oral or written 
communications in work areas during work time); Stoddard-Quirk Mfg. Co., 138 
N.L.R.B. 615, 616, 620 (1962) (giving oral solicitations more protection against 
employer interference than written distributions); see also Hirsch, supra note 64, at 
285-95. However, because the Board concluded that Republic Aviation does not apply 
to electronic communications, it did not address these issues. 
 156 351 N.L.R.B. at 1136. The policy was alleged to have violated Section 8(a)(1) of 
the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1), and the discipline was alleged to have discriminated 
against union activity, in violation of Section 8(a)(3). Id. § 158(a)(3) (making it unfair 
labor practice for employer “by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of 
employment or any term or condition of employment to encourage or discourage 
membership in any labor organization”). 
 157 The Board announcement stated that it was “especially interested” in questions 
that included whether employees or nonemployees have a right to use employer e-
mail and, if so, what extent employers can limit such use; whether traditional 
solicitation and distribution rules should apply; whether employers can monitor e-
mail use; whether location is relevant to these questions; and current employer 
practices of limiting e-mail use. Notice of Oral Argument and Invitation to File Briefs 
at 1-2, Register-Guard, No. 36-CA-8743-1 (NLRB Jan. 10, 2007), available at 
http://www.nlrb.gov/nlrb/about/foia/documents/notice_of_argument.pdf. 
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[employer’s] e-mail system for Section 7 matters.”158 Thus, according 
to the Board, employers can restrict almost all use of their electronic 
communication systems, as long as they do not discriminate against 
union messages.159 The basis for this conclusion was the supposed rule 
that employers have a virtually unfettered right to control use of their 
personal property, even by employees.160 Yet this analysis was 
problematic for several reasons. 
As an initial matter, this “rule” consisted of a weak set of precedents 
that should no longer apply in any situation, especially one involving 
communication tools as important as e-mail and the Internet. These 
precedents were literally comprised of a series of self-citing, 
conclusory statements that gave employers broad control over 
property such as telephones and bulletin boards.161 The NLRB’s 
reliance on these statements both ignored their vulnerability and 
abandoned the opportunity to engage in the first substantive analysis 
of employers’ control over their communication systems and other 
personal property. 
This missed opportunity was particularly harmful because in 
adopting these precedents, the NLRB turned property law on its head. 
Real property — which was the employer’s ostensible interest in 
Republic Aviation and other communication cases — warrants far more 
protection than personal property.162 Accordingly, an employer’s 
interest in controlling its personal property should be given less 
weight than its interest in controlling real property, not more weight as 
the NLRB concluded in Register Guard. The Board could perhaps be 
forgiven for misconstruing an area outside of its expertise, even 
 
 158 351 N.L.R.B. at 1114. 
 159 The Register-Guard Board dramatically narrowed the definition of 
“discrimination” in communication cases by concluding that it meant only treating 
communications of a similar character unequally. 351 N.L.R.B. at 1117-18 (allowing, 
for instance, employer to exclude “membership organizations” from workplace, but 
allowing all others); see also Jeffrey M. Hirsch, E-Mail and the Rip Van Winkle of 
Agencies: The NLRB’s Register-Guard Decision, in WORKPLACE PRIVACY: HERE AND 
ABROAD — PROCEEDINGS OF THE NEW YORK UNIVERSITY 61ST ANNUAL CONFERENCE ON 
LABOR 204-09 (2009). 
 160 351 N.L.R.B. at 1114. 
 161 See Union Carbide Corp. v. NLRB, 714 F.2d 657, 663-64 (6th Cir. 1983); 
Honeywell, Inc., 262 N.L.R.B. 1402, 1402 (1982), enforced, 722 F.2d 405 (8th Cir. 
1983); Container Corp., 244 N.L.R.B. 318, 318 n.2 (1979), enforced, 649 F.2d 1213 
(6th Cir. 1981) (per curiam); see also Hirsch, supra note 159, at 193 (“[E]very single 
case cited by the majority in Register-Guard failed to engage in any substantive 
discussion of the extent to which employers should be allowed to limit employees’ use 
of employers’ personal property. Instead, the cases merely cite each other blindly.”). 
 162 See supra note 149 and accompanying text. 
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though it is a basic rule that most first-year law students learn, but the 
irony is that it did so as a means to disregard labor law. 
As noted, the distinction between Republic Aviation’s robust 
protection of workplace discourse and the meager protection of 
Lechmere had explicitly been based on whether the speaker was an 
employee.163 Under this dichotomy, the NLRB should have applied 
Republic Aviation to the employee e-mails in Register-Guard.164 Thus, 
the NLRB’s insistence on using a quasi-Lechmere analysis directly 
contradicted precedent of both the Supreme Court and the Board 
itself.165 Compounding this offense is that the contradiction was a 
means to permit employers far greater leeway to hinder employee 
discourse. 
In an area that purportedly attempts to balance employer and 
employee interests, electronic communications represented a sea of 
change.166 Despite the NLRB’s description, e-mail and other electronic 
communications are substantively distinct from traditional forms of 
communication. Use of an employer’s worksite, like in Republic 
Aviation and Lechmere, is a physical invasion that often involves some 
degree of interference with the employer’s enjoyment of its property.167 
In contrast, e-mail and other electronic communications are far less 
intrusive.168 With rare exception,169 using an employer’s e-mail system 
for nonbusiness purposes does not interfere appreciably with other 
 
 163 See supra notes 119-22 and accompanying text. 
 164 351 N.L.R.B. at 1123-24 (Members Liebman and Walsh, dissenting). 
 165 The majority in Register-Guard disclaimed this conflict, but failed to explain 
satisfactorily how its ruling was consistent with the employee-nonemployee 
distinction emphasized in Lechmere. Id. at 1116 n.12.  
 166 William R. Corbett, Awaking Rip Van Winkle: Has the National Labor Relations 
Act Reached a Turning Point?, 9 NEV. L.J. 247, 271 (2009). 
 167 Malin & Perritt, supra note 98, at 48-49; cf. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan 
CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 426, 435 (1982) (holding permanent physical invasion of 
property was unconstitutional taking of property). Of course, under Republic Aviation, 
a physical invasion by employees to engage in communications may be protected by 
the NLRA. Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793, 795-97 (1945). 
 168 Fisk & Malamud, supra note 3, at 2072-73 (citing evidence of e-mail’s costs 
provided in Register-Guard amicus briefs and criticizing Board for failing to address 
data). This is especially true when employees communicate with their own hardware, 
using only the employer’s communication network — as was the case with two of the 
e-mails in Register-Guard. See supra text in note 154. 
 169 See, e.g., CompuServe Inc. v. Cyber Promotions, Inc., 962 F. Supp. 1015, 1019 
(S.D. Ohio 1997) (noting argument that extremely large volumes of e-mail from 
spammer diminished computer system’s performance); Washington Adventist Hosp., 
Inc., 291 N.L.R.B. 95, 102-03 (1988) (concluding electronic message was not 
protected because it automatically appeared on employees’ computers and remained 
until deleted). 
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uses of the system.170 Therefore, if the need to balance employer and 
employee interests is to be taken seriously,171 use of employers’ e-mail 
systems for collective-action purposes deserves greater protection. 
The NLRB’s failure to protect electronic communications repeats 
Lechmere’s mistake of assuming that any mode of discourse satisfies 
employees’ right to collective action.172 The Board’s conclusion that 
employers should not have to yield any control of their personal 
property unless employees are “entirely deprived” of even indirect 
contact with others ignores the realities of group action.173 Substantive 
interaction is required for individuals to act together. Although 
electronic communications are not ideal, they provide an effective 
means of discourse that can promote employees’ labor rights while 
imposing few legitimate costs on employers.174 The NLRB should be 
promoting electronic communications, not curtailing their use. 
The Obama NLRB is likely to dismantle Register-Guard. If it does so 
by applying an updated Republic Aviation analysis, the Board could 
 
 170 Intel Corp. v. Hamidi, 71 P.3d 296, 308 (Cal. 2003) (sending of unwanted e-
mail did not cause “any physical or functional harm or disruption”); Guard Publ’g 
Co., 351 N.L.R.B. 1110, 1125 (2007) (Members Liebman and Walsh, dissenting). 
Excessive nonbusiness use of e-mail and the Internet can conceivably result in some 
costs to the employer. Register-Guard, 351 N.L.R.B. at 1114 (arguing that employer 
may want to limit nonbusiness e-mail for purpose of “preserving server space, 
protecting against computer viruses and dissemination of confidential information, 
and avoiding company liability for employees’ inappropriate e-mails”). However, in 
most instances, labor-related e-mail would represent a very small number of messages 
with virtually no costs to the employer. Hamidi, 71 P.3d at 308 (rejecting e-mail 
trespass claim because “[t]he system worked as designed, delivering the messages 
without any physical or functional harm or disruption. These occasional transmissions 
cannot reasonably be viewed as impairing the quality or value of [the employer’s] 
computer system”). 
 171 NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 351 U.S. 105, 112 (1956) (“Organization 
rights are granted to workers by the same authority, the National Government, that 
preserves property rights. Accommodation between the two must be obtained with as 
little destruction of one as is consistent with the maintenance of the other.”). 
 172 To be fair, as the Board noted, the employees in Register-Guard had more 
alternatives than did the union in Lechmere because the Register-Guard employees 
could still engage in oral solicitations and literature distribution. 351 N.L.R.B. at 1115. 
However, the Board’s decision does little for the growing number of employees whose 
communications with coworkers frequently, if not mostly, take place through 
electronic means. Id. at 1116 n.13 (declining to “pass on circumstances, not present 
here, in which there are no means of communication among employees at work other 
than e-mail” (emphasis added)). 
 173 Id. at 1115. 
 174 One obvious cost to most employers is collective action by their employees; 
however, the interest in suppressing collective action is illegitimate under the NLRA. 
See supra text in note 48. 
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significantly improve employees’ ability to act together in workplaces 
that rely heavily on electronic communications. Moreover, 
congressional action that applied a similar rule to nonemployee 
speakers, or some other reform that effectively overturns Lechmere, 
would promote discourse in workplaces that use fewer electronic 
communications.175 This wholesale reform would impose a simple 
analysis that adequately protects all employees’ ability to access 
information and discuss group strategy. 
If labor law’s right to collective action is to exist in any meaningful 
way, there must be more recognition of the importance of workplace 
discourse. Employees ultimately may decide not to act collectively. 
However, only if they possessed relevant information and 
opportunities for substantive discussions can we presume that they 
based their choice on the risks and benefits involved, rather than an 
inability to overcome the barriers to collective action. 
B. Discourse and Information During the Representation Process 
Another area in which discourse plays a key role is the process by 
which employees choose a collective-bargaining representative. 
Throughout the representation process — from the initial stages of 
employees’ contemplating the desirability of collective representation 
to the later steps of ultimately choosing a specific representative — 
discourse and access to certain types of information is crucial. Indeed, 
the process is unlikely ever to begin without employees having a basic 
familiarity with union representation and an ability to discuss its costs 
and benefits.176 During an organizing campaign, employees learn about 
unionization from many actors including coworkers, employers, 
unions, and at times outside groups. If employees’ final choice on 
whether to seek collective representation is to be truly free, they must 
have the opportunity to interact among themselves and process these 
disparate sources of information. Without a significant amount of such 
 
 175 The new rule could impose a presumption that employer restrictions on most 
workplace communications are invalid — perhaps excepting communications during 
work time, to the extent it can be delineated — while allowing the employer to rebut 
that presumption based on a valid business justification. Yet, to keep the rule relevant 
to the modern workplace, it would have to abandon the current distinction between 
oral and written communications, as well as lessen the significance of a designated 
work area or work time. See sources cited supra note 155. Finally, some Board-
established norms would also be helpful, such as a certain number of union 
distributions or opportunities to address employees allowed during a typical 
campaign. 
 176 See supra notes 121-22, 132-45 and accompanying text.  
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interaction, employees will be unable to form the social bonds and 
opinions necessary to make a well-reasoned decision.177 
Yet, in today’s workplace, this picture of employees’ rationally 
weighing the costs and benefits of collective representation is largely 
an illusion. Unions, in particular, have widely criticized the NLRB’s 
regulation of the representation process as limiting, rather than 
protecting, employees’ freedom to consider unionization. As a result, 
this area is the subject of one of the few serious attempts to modify the 
NLRA in decades, the Employee Free Choice Act (“EFCA”).178 
Although it is presently unclear whether Congress will ever enact 
some form of the bill,179 EFCA provides a useful illustration of the role 
that discourse plays throughout the representation process and why it 
deserves far more consideration than it has garnered thus far. 
Since its introduction, EFCA has been the center of a fierce political 
debate that has involved hyperbolic views on both sides, ranging from 
suggestions that the bill will save the economy to suggestions that it 
will open the door for a Sopranos-style workplace run by union 
mobsters.180 Largely absent in these debates — even in more moderate, 
well-reasoned discussions — has been the bill’s impact on employee 
discourse and collective action. On one hand, this is surprising 
because the potential impact of the bill is significant. On the other 
hand, EFCA is merely the most recent of many instances in which 
discourse has taken an unjustified backseat to other considerations.181 
Correcting that oversight, whether through EFCA or other labor law 
 
 177 See supra Part I. 
 178 Employee Free Choice Act of 2009, H.R. 1409, 111th Cong. (2009). The only 
other recently proposed amendment to the NLRA that had any serious backing in 
Congress was The Teamwork for Employees and Managers Act of 1995, H.R. 743, 
104th Cong. (1996) (“TEAM Act”), which would have lowered restrictions on 
employer-sponsored workplace participation groups. Id. § 3 (amending 29 U.S.C. § 
158(a)(2)). The House and Senate passed the TEAM Act, which President Clinton 
vetoed. 142 CONG. REC. H8816 (1996). 
 179 Alec MacGillis, Specter Unveils Revised EFCA Bill, WASH. POST, Sept. 15, 2009, 
http://voices.washingtonpost.com/capitol-briefing/2009/09/specter_unveils_prospective_ 
de.html. 
 180 Compare Stewart Acuff, Mobilizing for the Employee Free Choice Act, 
HUFFINGTON POST (Feb. 16, 2009), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/stewart-
acuff/mobilizing-for-the-employ_b_167153.html (stating that “our economy cannot be 
fixed until we pass [EFCA] . . . and restore balance to [a ruined] economy”), with 
Center for a Democratic Workplace, Changes, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v= 
N6yrZtq27e0 (last visited Mar. 6, 2011) (showing advertisement using actor who was 
mobster (Johnny Sack) in The Sopranos television series to suggest undue influence on 
employees to sign cards). 
 181 See supra Part III.A. 
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reforms, is an important step in providing employees the freedom to 
engage in collective action that the NLRA intended. 
The centerpiece of the original EFCA legislation would have 
expanded the options for choosing a union. Current law allows for 
two distinct selection procedures. The traditional avenue is through an 
NLRB-run election; the alternative occurs when an employer 
voluntarily recognizes and bargains with a union that can show 
support from a majority of employees. 
An official election, although never the exclusive means of selecting 
a representative under the NLRA, has long been the preferred route to 
unionization.182 The election process formally begins once at least 30% 
of a group of employees indicates that it wants an election or already 
supports a given union.183 Following such a showing, the NLRB will 
arrange for an election to be held at the workplace, usually a month or 
two later.184  
This process is far from perfect, however. The most serious problem, 
at least from unions’ perspective, is that employers have substantial 
leeway to sway the vote. Weak penalties185 give many employers the 
freedom and incentive to engage in unlawful campaign tactics, such as 
firing or threatening union supporters and retaliating against union 
activity.186 Studies have shown that, despite their illegality, 
 
 182 NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 596 (1969); Craig Becker, Democracy 
in the Workplace: Union Representation Elections and Federal Labor Law, 77 MINN. L. 
REV. 495, 507-15 (1993) (noting that NLRB used to order recognition or bargaining 
without election). This refers only to an NLRB election; at times, a union and 
employer will agree to abide by the results of an election not run by the NLRB, which 
is considered another form of voluntary recognition. See e.g., Baggage Handlers at Los 
Angeles Airport Vote for Representation by SEIU Local 1877, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 
129, at A-7 (July 5, 2000) (describing employer’s agreement to abide by employees’ 
vote on union representation in privately run election). 
 183 29 U.S.C. § 159(c) (2006); 29 C.F.R. § 101.18(a) (2011). Evidence of employee 
support for an election is usually made through authorization “cards” that employees 
sign indicating a desire for an election, designating a union as the employee’s 
collective-bargaining representative, or both. Gissel, 395 U.S. at 595-610. 
 184 See infra note 236. 
 185 There are currently no monetary fines for unfair labor practices; at most, the 
employer will face backpay awards for unlawful terminations. The typical “penalty” 
for election misconduct is to re-run an election that the union lost. However, this is 
often well worth the risk for an employer because delay seriously undermines 
organizing efforts. See Employee Free Choice Act of 2009, H.R. 1409, 111th Cong. 
(2009) (amending NLRA to include fines for unfair labor practices related to 
representation process); DANNIN, supra note 3, at 52-55; infra note 190. 
 186 RICHARD B. FREEMAN & JAMES L. MEDOFF, WHAT DO UNIONS DO? 234-36 (1984) 
(describing studies); Morris M. Kleiner, Intensity of Management Resistance: 
Understanding the Decline of Unionization in the Private Sector, 22 J. LAB. RES. 519, 528-
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terminations, threats, and other discipline targeting union supporters 
are widespread in organizing campaigns. For example, Professor Kate 
Bronfenbrenner recently found widespread use of a variety of tactics 
that are typically illegal including discharge of union activists in 34% 
of campaigns, threats in 69%, harassment in 41%, and interrogations 
in 64%.187 Other studies have estimated that one out of eighteen 
workers in an organizing campaign faces some form of unlawful 
discrimination.188 
Employers are also allowed to engage in many lawful strategies that 
significantly reduce support for a union.189 For example, an employer 
can file challenges that delay the vote, decreasing a union’s chance of 
success once the election finally occurs.190 Even if a union has already 
won an election, an employer can still file challenges — ones that 
postpone official recognition of the win for years in some instances, 
 
30 (2001). See generally Matthew T. Bodie, Information and the Market for Union 
Representation, 94 VA. L. REV. 1, 5-24 (2008) (describing NLRB election process and 
many of its problems). 
 187 Kate Bronfenbrenner, No Holds Barred: The Intensification of Employer Opposition 
to Organizing 10-11 (Econ. Policy Inst. Briefing Paper No. 235, 2009) (survey of 1999-
2003 campaigns), available at http://epi.3cdn.net/edc3b3dc172dd1094f_0ym6ii96d.pdf; 
see also COMMISSION ON THE FUTURE OF WORKER-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS (commonly 
known as “Dunlop Commission”), FACT FINDING REPORT 86 (1994), available at 
http://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1279&context=key_ 
workplace (finding unlawful terminations in 25% of campaigns). 
 188 Charles Morris, A Tale of Two Statutes: Discrimination for Union Activity Under 
the NLRA and RLA, 2 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 317, 330 (1998); see also Paul Weiler, 
Promises To Keep: Securing Workers’ Rights to Self-Organization Under the NLRA, 96 
HARV. L. REV. 1769, 1781 (1983) (estimating that union supporters have one in twenty 
chance of being fired for exercising labor rights). 
 189 Virtually all employers mount some opposition to union. Bronfenbrenner, supra 
note 187, at 11 (finding opposition in 96% of campaigns and average of 11 tactics — 
both lawful and unlawful — per campaign).  
 190 Generally, the longer the time period, the more difficult it is for the union to 
maintain support. Kate L. Bronfenbrenner, Employer Behavior in Certification Elections 
and First-Contract Campaigns: Implications for Labor Law Reform, in RESTORING THE 
PROMISE OF AMERICAN LABOR LAW 75, 78-79 (Sheldon Friedman et al. eds., 1994) 
(describing win rate declining from 53% if election occurs within 50 days after 
election petition, to 41% if election occurs 61-180 days later); see James Brudney, 
Neutrality Agreements and Card Check Recognition: Prospects for Changing Paradigms, 
90 IOWA L. REV. 819, 832 (2005) (describing why unions try to obtain employer 
neutrality and voluntary recognition agreements); Myron Roomkin & Richard N. 
Block, Case Processing Time and the Outcome of Representation Elections: Some 
Empirical Evidence, 1981 U. ILL. L. REV. 75, 88-89 (1981) (finding similar results to 
Bronfenbrenner). 
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often resulting in the union losing majority support before it ever has 
the chance to represent employees.191 
Additionally, employers are permitted to make strong anti-union 
statements to employees. Although lawful in most instances, these 
statements — enhanced by the “home-field advantage” employers 
enjoy because the election and most campaigning occurs at the 
worksite — are extremely successful in reducing support for unions.192 
One of the most prominent of these strategies is the “captive-audience 
speech,” in which an employer disparages a union during a meeting 
that employees are required to attend.193 Captive-audience speeches 
are extremely effective at undermining unions’ support; thus, it is not 
surprising that employees often face a large number of them during 
organizing campaigns.194 Indeed, recent studies have typically found 
that about 90% of employers use captive-audience speeches in 
contested elections.195  
The results of these techniques, and others, have made the NLRB 
election process one of futility for many unions.196 Unions, therefore, 
have increasingly avoided official elections and have turned instead to 
an alternate form of representation in which they pressure employers 
to recognize and bargain with unions based on a “card-check” 
 
 191 Brudney, supra note 190, at 834 n.65, 868-69. The NLRB officially recognizes a 
vote in favor of a union by “certifying” the union as the exclusive bargaining 
representative of the employees. 29 U.S.C. § 159(c) (2006).  
 192 Bronfenbrenner, supra note 187, at 10 (not distinguishing between lawful and 
unlawful statements); FREEMAN & MEDOFF, supra note 186, 234-36 (describing 
studies). Statements may be unlawful if they contain threats. 29 U.S.C. § 158(c) 
(2006); NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 617-18 (1969). 
 193 Paul M. Secunda, The Captive Audience: United States: Toward the Viability of 
State-Based Legislation To Address Workplace Captive Audience Meetings in the United 
States, 29 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 209, 214 (2008). 
 194 Bronfenbrenner, supra note 187, at 10, 13 (finding that 89% of employers used 
average of 10.4 captive-audience speeches and that unions won 73% of campaigns 
without such speeches but only 47% with speeches). 
 195 Id.; Internationally Recognized Core Labour Standards in the United States: Report 
for WTO General Council Review of the Trade Policies of the United States, 
INTERNATIONAL CONFEDERATION OF FREE TRADE UNIONS, 3 (2004), available at 
http://www.icftu.org/www/pdf/usclsreport2004.pdf (finding captive-audience speeches 
by 92% of employers in contested elections); see also FREEMAN & MEDOFF, supra note 
186, 234-37 (describing studies); Kleiner, supra note 186, at 526-30. 
 196 It is difficult to tie directly employers’ lawful and unlawful campaign activities 
to unions’ success rates, but the correlative evidence is quite strong. See 
Bronfenbrenner, supra note 187, at 10-13. More support for that argument, albeit 
weaker, is that employer unfair labor practices are more prevalent in mid- and large-
sized firms, where unions’ success rate is lower. Brudney, supra note 190, at 830, 870 
(noting also that it is more difficult generally for unions to organize larger groups of 
employees). 
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showing of majority support.197 Under the card-check process, if a 
majority of employees attest — usually by signing an authorization 
card — to their desire to be represented by a union, the employer can 
“voluntarily recognize” the labor organization.198 Currently, however, 
the employer always has the option of rejecting voluntary recognition 
and forcing the union to seek an NLRB election; it is the employer’s 
choice alone.199 Despite the difficulties in convincing employers to 
give up their right to insist on an election, unions now seek voluntary 
recognition in over 80% of organizing drives.200 The question whether 
such recognition should remain a voluntary choice of employers is the 
subject of EFCA, one of the more contentious labor proposals in the 
last fifty years. 
1. Card-Check Certification 
Although EFCA was originally introduced in the waning days of 
President George W. Bush’s final term,201 the election of President 
Barack Obama in 2008 led union interests to make a renewed push for 
the bill, which would be the first significant amendment to the NLRA 
in decades.202 The 2009 EFCA legislation contained several provisions 
 
 197 The NLRB conducted 2,871 elections in Fiscal Year 2002, but only 2,085 
elections in Fiscal Year 2008 — a 27% decrease. See Brudney, supra note 190, at 824, 
834 (noting that majority of new union organizing avoids NLRB-election process, 
largely because employers’ disproportionate power to sway employees undermines 
fairness of Board-run elections); Memorandum from Arthur F. Rosenfeld, Nat’l Labor 
Relations Bd., Office of the Gen. Counsel to Emps. (Feb. 4, 2003), available at 
http://www.nlrb.gov/shared_files/GC%20Memo/2003/Summary_of_Operations_FY200
2.pdf; Press Release, Nat’l Labor Relations Bd., NLRB Gen. Counsel Issues Report on 
FY 2008 Operations (Oct. 29, 2008), available at http://www.nlrb.gov/shared_files/ 
Press%20Releases/2008/R-2675.pdf.  
 198 Under the current NLRA, the Board can certify a union as a collective-
bargaining representative only if it has won an NLRB election. 29 U.S.C. 
§ 159(c)(1)(A) (2006). 
 199 Id.; Linden Lumber Div. v. NLRB, 419 U.S. 301, 304-06 (1974). 
 200 See Brudney, supra note 190, at 839-40. See generally Julius Getman, The 
National Labor Relations Act: What Went Wrong; Can We Fix It?, 45 B.C. L. REV. 125, 
136 (2003) (citing increase in unions seeking voluntary recognition). 
 201 The bill was initially introduced in 2007, during the Bush Administration, but 
without any serious thought that it would pass at the time. Employee Free Choice Act 
of 2007, H.R. 800, 110th Cong. (2007) & S. 1041, 110th Cong. (2009); John Logan, 
End of the Road for the Employee Free Choice Act, or Just the Opening Salvo? POLITICAL 
AFFAIRS (June 28, 2007), http://www.politicalaffairs.net/end-of-the-road-for-the-
employee-free-choice-act-or-just-the-opening-salvo/ (passing House by 241-185 vote, 
but falling 9 votes short of overcoming Senate filibuster). 
 202 In 1974, Congress enacted a narrow set of amendments, extending coverage to 
the nonprofit health care industry. Health Care Institution Amendments, Pub. L. No. 
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related to representation and initial bargaining processes, but the one 
that garnered the most attention and criticism was the card-check 
certification requirement.203 
The card-check rule would require the NLRB to certify a union that 
could demonstrate that a majority of employees wanted it as their 
collective-bargaining representative — a showing based on signed 
authorization cards instead of an election.204 This represents a major 
shift from the current regime, under which the employer alone decides 
whether a union with a card-check majority can represent 
employees.205 Card-check certification would give this choice to 
unions and employees, with the purpose of making unionization 
easier by avoiding the problems associated with NLRB-run elections.206 
In the face of fierce opposition from many quarters, legislators 
stripped the card-check provision from the proposed EFCA.207 
However, the proposal is still worth addressing, as it illustrates two 
distinct views of the right to engage in collective action: collective 
action as a social good and as an act of individual choice. These 
divergent accounts play important roles in current labor law 
debates,208 and each would benefit greatly from an enhanced 
recognition of the importance of discourse in promoting employee 
collective action. 
 
93-360, 88 Stat. 395 (1974) (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 152, 158, 183). Prior to that act, 
the other substantial amendments to the NLRA occurred in the 1959 Labor-
Management Reporting and Disclosure Act, Pub. L. No. 86-257, 73 Stat. 519 (1959) 
(codified in scattered sections of 29 U.S.C.) (implementing, among other things, 
reporting requirements for unions and procedural rights for union members), and in 
the 1947 Taft-Hartley Act, Labor-Management Relations Act, Pub. L. No. 80-101, 61 
Stat. 136 (1947) (codified in scattered sections of 29 U.S.C.) (adding, among other 
things, union unfair labor practices).  
 203 Employee Free Choice Act of 2009, H.R. 1409, 111th Cong. (2009). 
 204 Id. § 2(a). 
 205 29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(1)(A) (2006). 
 206 Michele Campolieti et al., Labor Law Reform and the Role of Delay in Union 
Organizing: Empirical Evidence from Canada, 61 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 32, 33, 34 
(2007) (citing findings showing higher success rate in card-check provinces than 
quick-vote election provinces, both of which have higher success rates than current 
U.S. elections). See generally Sara Slinn, An Empirical Analysis of the Effects of the 
Change from Card-Check to Mandatory Vote Certification, 11 CAN. LAB. & EMP. L.J. 259 
(2004) (finding that Canadian card-check procedures had significantly higher rate of 
union success than various other election procedures, particularly in private sector). 
 207 See Steven Greenhouse, Democrats Drop Key Part of Bill To Assist Unions, N.Y. 
TIMES, July 17, 2009, at A1. 
 208 See Fisk & Malamud, supra note 3, at 2033-36 (describing tension between 
Wagner Act and Taft-Hartley Act).  
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EFCA’s card-check rule embodies a view of collective action as a 
social good.209 This approach — which is also reflected in the Wagner 
Act,210 the original version of the NLRA — regards employee collective 
action as a benefit for not only employees, but society as a whole. 
Indeed, the Wagner Act’s preamble explicitly states that collective 
action can equalize bargaining power in the workplace and reduce 
industrial strife, thereby improving the national economy.211 
Card-check certification makes sense under this social-good 
approach.212 Expanding employee collective action is itself a policy 
aim; thus, lowering barriers to collective action takes precedence over 
most other considerations.213 Card-check certification aptly fulfills that 
goal. Although it is unlikely that the rule would vastly increase union 
density,214 it would make unionization easier and, therefore, do more 
to satisfy the social-good approach than current law. 
This view of collective action as a social good was soon joined by 
another, often countervailing, approach. In the 1949 Taft-Hartley 
amendments to the NLRA, Congress acted on an alternative policy 
goal that stresses employees’ individual freedom to choose whether or 
not to engage in collective action.215 Under this view, the right to 
 
 209 “Social good” is used here only to denote the idea that promoting collective 
action will make society better off, primarily in the economic sense. It is not intended 
to contribute to the philosophical debate regarding the term’s meaning. See Samuel J. 
M. Donnelly, Towards a Personalist Jurisprudence: Basic Insights and Concepts, 28 LOY. 
L.A. L. REV. 547, 586-89 (1995). 
 210 Pub. L. No. 74-198, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. 
§§ 151-169 (2010)). 
 211 29 U.S.C. § 151 (2006). 
 212 See Brudney, supra note 190, at 856-60 (arguing that card-check recognition is 
consistent with NLRA, particularly given its use soon after enactment of Wagner Act). 
 213 See Adrienne E. Eaton & Jill Kriesky, NLRB Elections Versus Card Check 
Campaigns: Results of a Worker Survey, 62 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 157, 159 (2009) 
(noting theory that card-check recognition “reduces conflict and leads to more 
positive labor relations”). 
 214 See infra note 242 and accompanying text. 
 215 Pub. L. No. 80-101, 61 Stat. 136 (1947) (codified in scattered sections of 29 
U.S.C.). The tension between the two approaches was on display in the testimony of 
NLRB Chairman Battista and Member (now Chair) Liebman before a joint 
congressional hearing. Chairman Battista argued that the Taft-Hartley Act made the 
NLRA neutral; thus, labor law is indifferent to whether employees choose to engage in 
collective representation. The National Labor Relations Board: Recent Decisions and 
Their Impact on Workers’ Rights: Joint Hearing Before the House Subcommittee on Health, 
Employment, Labor & Pensions, and the Senate Subcommittee on Employment & 
Workplace Safety, 110th Cong. 18 (2007) (statement of Chairman Robert Battista). In 
contrast, Member Liebman expressed the view that the NLRA still promotes collective 
representation, albeit with Taft-Hartley’s limits: “The law’s overriding aim was and 
still is to make it possible for workers to freely choose collective representation and to 
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collective action focuses on individual choice, rather than the outcome 
of that choice. 
Card-check certification raises problems for this individual-choice 
approach. Although consistent in many ways — if signed 
authorization cards accurately reflect employees’ views, card-check 
certification reduces employer coercion and enhances free choice216 — 
the rule risks interfering with individual choice in its attempt to 
promote collective representation. For instance, opponents of card-
check certification argue that it would allow unions to coerce 
employees and misrepresent the significance of signing an 
authorization card.217 Alternatively, if one does not accept such 
criticism,218 the perceived shortcomings of card-check certification 
create a lack of legitimacy that could decrease support for an 
individual union and the labor movement as a whole. 
More generally, card-check certification raises concerns regarding 
employees’ ability to learn and communicate about unionization — 
concerns that are troublesome under both views of collective action. 
As Professor Matthew Bodie has explained, the election process 
already has difficulty providing employees the type of information 
needed to make a fully informed decision about unionization.219 By 
 
promote collective bargaining.” Id. at 64 (statement of Member Wilma Liebman) 
(emphasis added). 
 216 See generally Slinn, supra note 206 (finding that Canadian card-check 
procedures had significantly higher rate of union success than various other election 
procedures, particularly in private sector). 
 217 See, e.g., Changes, supra note 180 (showing Sopranos ad); see also Charles B. 
Craver, Rearranging Deck Chairs on the Titanic: The Inadequacy of Modest Proposals To 
Reform Labor Law, 93 MICH. L. REV. 1616, 1641 (1995) (arguing that secret ballots 
would be preferable to card-check certification in “perfect world” of quick elections 
and adequate enforcement of illegal tactics); Benjamin I. Sachs, Enabling Employee 
Choice: A Structural Approach to the Rules of Union Organizing, 123 HARV. L. REV. 655, 
669 (2010) (citing critics). The NLRA, however, already outlaws such actions and 
would consider substantiated claims of coercion or misrepresentation in determining 
whether the union has a valid showing of majority support. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(1)(A) 
(2010); Gulf Caribe Maritime, Inc., 330 N.L.R.B. 766, 766 n.2 (2000). Moreover, the 
Eaton and Kriesky survey found that employer anti-union pressure was substantially 
greater than pro-union pressure from union organizers or coworkers. Eaton & 
Kriesky, supra note 213, at 170 (noting also that employees believed they were free to 
choose for or against union equally when voting in NLRB-election or card-check 
processes). 
 218 There are many reasons not to accept these criticisms, both as a factual matter 
and because these supposed defenses of employee free choice often come from 
employers who work hard to prevent employees from unionizing. See supra notes 182-
95 and accompanying text. 
 219 Bodie, supra note 186, at 35-38 (characterizing union organizing process as 
more like decision to purchase services rather than political election). 
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circumventing formal elections and reducing employers’ opportunity 
to present their views, card-check certification would reduce 
employees’ access to information and ability to communicate among 
themselves.220 The result is that employees will have a more difficult 
time making an informed, free choice about collective 
representation.221 Further, the lack of information, and other problems 
that card-check certification implicates, invite skepticism, thereby 
reducing the reform’s value as a social good.222 
A recent survey of employees who had experienced an organizing 
campaign confirms the negative impact of card-check certification on 
their access to information.223 In the survey, Professors Adrienne 
Eaton and Jill Kriesky found a small but statistically significant 
decrease in the adequacy of information provided to employees in 
card-check campaigns versus NLRB-run elections.224 To be sure, some 
of that information — such as coercive statements or threats — is not 
beneficial,225 but other information — such as the union’s effectiveness 
or the employer’s ability to provide more compensation — is helpful. 
Basically, card-check certification throws out the good with the bad. 
The result is that many employees will be forced to decide whether to 
unionize with a suboptimal level of information.226 Indeed, one of the 
 
 220 Unions generally strive to keep card-check campaigns secret for as long as 
possible. Sachs, supra note 217, at 665, 671. 
 221 RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, THE CASE AGAINST THE EMPLOYEE FREE CHOICE ACT 25 
(2009). 
 222 Of course, card-check certification will often advance the social good approach 
by making unionization easier. However, the lack of information in some instances 
can reduce the likelihood that employees will choose a union. See infra notes 227-29 
and accompanying text. 
 223 Eaton & Kriesky, supra note 213, at 170-71. 
 224 Id. at 168 (analyzing surveys of employees involved in card-check organizing 
and NLRB elections, asking whether they had sufficient information about several 
subjects needed to make informed decision about unionization). But see Brudney, 
supra note 190, at 876 (arguing that information is not serious concern because 
employers have ability and motive to promote nonunion workforce long before 
campaign, that most important time for employees’ informed choice is contract 
negotiations, and that informational advantages of elections assumes idealized 
process). 
 225 Eaton and Kriesky’s survey also found that employees viewed information from 
employers as less accurate than information from unions. See Eaton & Kriesky, supra note 
213, at 169, 171. 
 226 See, e.g., Dana Corp., 351 N.L.R.B. 434, 443 (2007) (emphasizing that 
employees need forty-five day decertification window after voluntary recognition to 
allow them “to fully discuss their views concerning collective-bargaining 
representation”). But see id. at 449 (Members Liebman and Walsh, dissenting) (noting 
employees’ need to discuss while union solicited support and arguing that employer’s 
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findings in the Eaton and Kriesky survey demonstrates how this lack 
of information could hurt union organizing efforts.  
The survey found that employees who believed that they lacked 
sufficient information were far less likely to sign an authorization card 
— effectively voting against the union.227 Similarly, the survey found 
that nearly half of employees who did not support the union, in both 
card-check and election campaigns, claimed that lack of familiarity 
was the reason.228 In effect, the lack of information appears to have a 
direct relationship with employees’ refusal to join together with other 
employees — exactly the result one would expect from theories of 
collective action.229 The extent to which this problem influences the 
outcome of organizing campaigns is unclear, but the Eaton and 
Kriesky survey demonstrates that the card-check process deprives 
employees of information that they perceive as valuable.230 
Although the removal of card-check certification from EFCA was 
more the result of political calculations than reasoned policymaking, it 
provides a valuable lesson for future reform efforts.231 In particular, 
reforms should avoid pitting the two views of collective action against 
each other. Even ignoring the political risks of sacrificing one view to 
favor the other, a principled approach to labor law must recognize the 
limits of each. Collective action is beneficial in many circumstances, 
but not in all. Similarly, individual free choice is important, but for 
that choice to be truly free, there must be a substantial level of 
information and discourse existing in an environment devoid of 
coercion. Card-check certification, although addressing serious 
problems in the NLRB-election process, fails to balance these 
concerns. 
A better approach would address the current shortcomings of Board 
elections while still encouraging discourse, access to information, and 
 
antiunion campaign is not needed to foster employee free choice); Sachs, supra note 
217, at 707-12 (arguing that information is sufficient in card-check campaigns 
because employers have incentive to express their views, employees are typically 
aware of what being nonunion means, and third-party organizations provide 
information about unions). 
 227 Eaton & Kriesky, supra note 213, at 168. 
 228 Id. (finding that 42% of employees cited lack of familiarity as major reason for 
lack of support, although most workers who signed cards felt they had sufficient 
information). 
 229 See supra Part II. Some of this effect is likely due to employees’ unwillingness to 
support a given union or unions in general, rather than a lack of desire to act 
collectively in other situations. But the finding still shows information’s ability to 
promote or inhibit individuals’ willingness to engage in collective action. 
 230 Eaton & Kriesky, supra note 213, at 171. 
 231 Greenhouse, supra note 207. 
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freedom of choice. None of these goals are easy to accomplish, but 
their aims are consistent. Free choice depends upon access to a high 
level of information and discourse combined with the ability to 
exercise that choice without fear of coercion or retaliation. Thus, labor 
law reforms that diminish coercive election practices while increasing 
the flow of information and the opportunity for discourse will both 
enhance individual choice and increase the amount and quality of 
collective action. There are numerous proposals that address some of 
these goals,232 but this Article will focus on those raised as part of the 
EFCA debate. 
2. Quick Elections 
One reform that some have proposed to improve the election 
process was the “quick election,” a direct substitute for EFCA’s card-
check provision. EFCA proponents regarded the quick election as a 
second-best solution that was more politically viable than card-check 
certification.233 The quick election is a procedure, used off-and-on in 
several Canadian provinces, that has the potential to reduce the level 
of coercion in elections.234 The idea is to compress the election period 
so that employers have less time to influence the election, thereby 
decreasing the risk of coercion.235 
Current NLRB-run elections occur, on average, thirty-eight days 
after a petition is filed, and 95% of all elections occur within fifty-six 
days after filing.236 During that period, employers usually bombard 
employees with anti-union messages, both legal and illegal. Studies 
 
 232 See generally William B. Gould IV, New Labor Law Reform Variations on an Old 
Theme: Is the Employee Free Choice Act the Answer?, 70 LA. L. REV. 1 (2009) (discussing 
various reform proposals). 
 233 MacGillis, supra note 179. 
 234 Manitoba Labor Relations Act, R.S.M., c. L-10 § 48(3) (Can.) (describing seven-
day “quick election”); Newfoundland Labour Relations Act, R.S.N.L., c. L-1 § 47(4) 
(Can.) (providing for five-day “quick election” period); Nova Scotia Trade Union Act, 
R.S.N.S., c. 475 § 25(3) (Can.) (five days); Ontario Labour Relations Act, R.S.O., c. 1 
§ 8(5) (Can.) (five days). British Columbia used to have a ten-day period. Campolieti 
at al., supra note 206, at 48-49. 
 235 A shorter period would also reduce opportunities for illegal coercion. Similarly, 
EFCA would increase remedies for coercion and other unlawful campaign conduct. 
Employee Free Choice Act of 2009, H.R. 1409, 111th Cong. § 4 (2009). 
 236 Press Release, Nat’l Labor Relations Bd., supra note 197, at 6 (noting median). 
Data over the last decade shows a similar average, as well as the potential for 
significant post-election delay — up to 1,705 days in one instance. John-Paul 
Ferguson, The Eyes of the Needles: A Sequential Model of Union Organizing Drives, 
1999–2004, 62 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 3, 10 n.9 (2008) (finding average election took 
forty-one days and 95% of elections occurred within seventy-five days). 
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have long shown that such messages work exceedingly well; increases 
in anti-union tactics, especially captive-audience speeches, result in 
significant decreases in union support.237 Even when a union is able to 
get elected, delays in certifying the result reduce the likelihood of the 
union being able to reach an initial collective-bargaining agreement — 
referred to as a “first contract” — with the employer.238  
The argument for implementing quick elections is that a shortened 
campaign period will reduce the chance of employer coercion leading 
to a union loss or failure to reach a first contract.239 Yet, because they 
reduce the opportunity for discussion and information gathering, 
quick elections raise some initial concerns about their impact on 
employee discourse. Ultimately, however, quick elections provide a 
rare example in which less discourse is more. Indeed, unlike card-
check certification or the status quo, quick elections are able to satisfy 
both the social-good and individual-choice approaches to collective 
action.240 
Quick elections can fulfill the goals of the social-good approach if 
they can increase unions’ success in organizing campaigns. Data from 
Canada indicate that this, in fact, is the result of quick elections. In 
Canada, shorter election cycles have substantially increased unions’ 
effectiveness in organizing employees or bargaining on their behalf, 
particularly when there is substantial compliance with the time 
limits.241 Thus, quick elections would likely expand collective action 
in the United States.242 
 
 237 See supra notes 183-95 and accompanying text. 
 238 Bronfenbrenner, supra note 187, at 3 (finding that 52% of unions do not have 
first contract one year after winning an election, and 37% do not have contract two 
years later); see also Karen Bentham, Employer Resistance to Union Certification, 57 
RELATIONS INDUSTRIELLES/INDUS. REL. 159, 180 (2002) (providing Canadian data); 
William N. Cooke, Determinants of the Outcomes of Union Certification Elections, 36 
INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 402, 402 (1983) (providing U.S. data). 
 239 See Weiler, supra note 188, at 1812. 
 240 See supra notes 209-18 and accompanying text. 
 241 For instance, a recent study showed that quick elections, in combination with 
expedited unfair labor practice hearings, can increase the chances of unions becoming 
certified. See Campolieti at al., supra note 206, at 48-49, 53-54 (using data from 
British Columbia and Ontario — whose representation laws alternated between card-
check certification and quick elections periods of seven to ten days). See generally 
Brudney, supra note 190, at 880 n.297 (citing studies showing union win rates in 
Canadian quick elections roughly similar to U.S. card-check drives).  
 242 However, an increase in union success from quick elections is unlikely to 
reverse substantially the large decline in U.S. union density. See supra note 62. 
Although some of this decline is probably due to employer tactics, other factors — 
particularly the increasingly competitive global economy — make a substantial 
resurgence in union representation unlikely. See Jeffrey M. Hirsch & Barry T. Hirsch, 
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Quick elections accomplish the goals of the individual-choice 
approach as well. Although an employer can provide some useful 
information for employees deciding whether to unionize, there are 
diminishing returns and, in many occasions, outright costs to repeated 
communications by the employer.243 As employers’ anti-union 
messages become less informative and more coercive, employees’ 
ability to choose freely whether to unionize becomes compromised.244 
Even if employees have sufficient information to weigh the potential 
costs and benefits of organizing, the employer’s recurring 
communications may result in a justifiable belief that one of the chief 
costs is the potential for retaliation. Limiting the election period in 
order to minimize this illegitimate cost is warranted. 
Despite the need for some limits on the duration of election 
campaigns, concern for employee discourse is still appropriate. In 
particular, employees’ ability to access information and discuss their 
options should not be overly burdened by the attempt to reduce 
coercion. For example, in Canada, the typical period for quick 
elections is between five and seven days,245 which is similar to the low 
end of proposals under EFCA.246 That cycle, however, seems too short 
to provide employees with a genuine opportunity to learn about and 
discuss unionization. This is especially true in large workplaces where 
many employees may be absent for part or all of the election period. 
Indeed, a five-day election is so short that it appears — probably not 
coincidentally — to mirror card-check certification more than a real 
election. A longer period, such as fourteen days, seems more 
reasonable. Two weeks is ample time for almost all employees to be 
informed about unionization and engage in discussions about their 
options, while at the same time minimizing the coercive effects of 
employers’ anti-union missives.247 
 
The Rise and Fall of Private Sector Unionism: What Next for the NLRA?, 34 FLA. ST. U. L. 
REV. 1133, 1138-39 (2007). 
 243 See Bodie, supra note 186, at 53-54 (emphasizing strong incentives for 
employers to provide negative information about union and positive information 
about itself). 
 244 See supra notes 187-90. 
 245 See supra note 234. However, actual delays in Ontario and British Columbia, 
which had seven- and ten-day quick election rules respectively, were 50.6 days in 
Ontario (from 1995-1998) and 23.8 days in British Columbia (from 1987-1992). See 
Campolieti et al., supra note 206, at 50-51. 
 246 See Greenhouse, supra note 207, at A1 (noting proposals from five to ten days). 
 247 But see Samuel Estreicher, The Dunlop Report and the Future of Labor Law 
Reform, 12 LAB. LAW. 117, 127 (1996) (arguing that two weeks is insufficient for 
employees to hear anti-union view). 
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3. Regulating Captive-Audience Speeches 
Among the lawful tactics that employers use to stave off 
unionization, perhaps none are as prevalent and effective as captive-
audience speeches. For decades, these mandatory speeches have been 
lawful as long as they do not occur within twenty-four hours of an 
election and are not threatening.248 As noted, several studies have 
shown that frequent use of captive-audience speeches dramatically 
reduces support for a union.249 Consequently, they are a common and 
recurring part of most organizing campaigns, which is a major factor 
in unions’ avoidance of NLRB-run elections. 
Captive-audience speeches, it has been argued, are inconsistent with 
employees’ freedom to choose whether to unionize.250 Indeed, prior to 
1953, the NLRB considered these speeches to be illegal unless an 
employer also provided the union access to employees.251 Since that 
time, the NLRB and courts have not only allowed employer-only 
speeches, but also limited union access to the workplace more 
generally, resulting in employees typically receiving an extraordinarily 
unbalanced picture of unionism.252 
Despite the controversy surrounding captive-audience speeches, 
there have been few attempts to limit their use. One recent exception, 
which implicates preemption issues, has been a push for state 
regulation.253 A few states have considered prohibitions against 
captive-audience speeches, but they remain in the minority.254 
However, following the demise of EFCA’s card-check rule, federal 
legislators have proposed a different solution to the captive-audience 
 
 248 See Peerless Plywood Co., 107 N.L.R.B. 427, 429-30 (1953) (emphasizing that 
union has no reasonable means to respond in that short period of time). 
 249 See supra notes 194-95. 
 250 See Secunda, supra note 193, at 209-10, 226-27. 
 251 See Bonwit-Teller, Inc., 96 N.L.R.B. 608, 614-15 (1951), modified, 104 N.L.R.B. 
497 (1953). The NLRB overruled Bonwit-Teller in Livingston Shirt Corp., 107 N.L.R.B. 
400 (1953), approved by NLRB v. Steelworkers (NuTone & Avondale), 357 U.S. 357 
(1958). 
 252 See supra Part III.A. 
 253 See Secunda, supra note 193, at 212, 238-40 (arguing that NLRA preemption 
does not apply). But see Kye D. Pawlenko, The Non-Viability of State Regulations of 
Workplace Captive Audience Meetings: A Response to Professor Secunda, 32 HAMLINE L. 
REV. 191, 191-95 (2009).  
 254 Oregon recently enacted a captive-audience law, which is currently being 
challenged on First Amendment and NLRA preemption grounds. See Or. Laws, SB 
518, ch. 658 (2009); Associated Or. Indus. v. Avakian, No. CV 09-1494-MO, 2010 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 44263, at *4-6 (D. Or. May 6, 2010); see also Secunda, supra note 
193, at 226-28 (noting states that considered such laws). 
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problem. Under a proposed amendment to EFCA, captive-audience 
speeches would remain lawful. But when an employer held such a 
speech, it would also have to give the union a right to address 
employees at the workplace. In essence, this proposal would return 
the law back to the early days of the NLRA.255 Although potentially an 
improvement over the status quo because of its ability to promote 
collective action and individual choice,256 this approach is problematic. 
The crux of the problem with the equal-access rule is that in many 
instances it would simply reduce employees’ access to information 
about unionization. Many, if not most, employers would forgo captive-
audience speeches to avoid giving a union access to the workplace. It 
is in employers’ interests to keep positive information about 
unionization at a minimum because such information is a key 
ingredient in employees’ willingness to organize.257 For most 
employers, preserving this information barrier would be more 
beneficial than conducting a captive-audience speech. In addition, 
employers would easily be able to skirt the rule. Employers are well 
aware that holding nonmandatory meetings would generally serve the 
same purpose as a captive-audience speech. Even if a meeting is 
“voluntary,” most employees would feel obligated to attend, giving 
employers virtually the same opportunity to influence the election as 
before.258 The likely result of this reform, therefore, is neither an 
increase in collective action nor greater protection for individual 
choice.  
Instead of allowing employers to decide whether employees can hear 
from a union at work — the most useful venue for employee discourse 
— labor law should promote employees’ opportunity to hear from 
both sides. The NLRB or Congress could continue to allow employer 
captive-audience speeches, but also give unions reasonable access to 
the workplace, no matter what the employer does.259 If employees are 
to make a truly free choice about unionization, they need to learn 
 
 255 See MacGillis, supra note 179. 
 256 See supra notes 209-18 and accompanying text. 
 257 See supra note 228. 
 258 Cf. NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 617 (1969) (emphasizing “the 
economic dependence of the employees on their employers, and the necessary 
tendency of the former . . . to pick up intended implications of the latter that might be 
more readily dismissed by a more disinterested ear”).  
 259 This rule is well within the NLRB policymaking authority. Peerless Plywood 
Co., 107 N.L.R.B. 427, 429 (1953) (noting statutory authority to ban captive-audience 
speeches made within twenty-four hours before election); see Bonwit-Teller, Inc., 96 
N.L.R.B. 608, 614-15 (1951) (prohibiting captive-audience speeches generally), 
overturned by Livingston Shirt Corp., 107 N.L.R.B. 400 (1953). 
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about the possible costs and benefits. Although information from the 
union and the employer is suboptimal, hearing from both sides is 
more helpful than hearing from just one.260 
This rule would be relatively easy to implement and could be 
modeled on the existing Republic Aviation scheme. Under the Republic 
Aviation analysis proposed earlier, unions would have a presumptive 
right of reasonable access to the workplace; employers could rebut this 
presumption if legitimate business needs warrant more stringent 
restrictions.261 Such a rule would address the inequities of the current 
regime. Employers could continue to make captive-audience speeches, 
but unions’ new access rights would allow them to respond far more 
effectively. Moreover, the risk of coercion from frequent captive-
audience speeches would be muted if this rule were enacted 
contemporaneously with a quick election provision. A two-week 
period would allow for dramatically fewer captive-audience speeches 
than most employees currently face. Thus, employees would benefit 
from more balanced information and a lower incidence of coercion. 
C. Mandated Information Transference 
Beyond the more complex role of interpersonal discourse is the 
reality that employees generally will not even consider collective 
action without access to basic information about the process. If 
employees are unaware of legal protections for collective action or lack 
information about their strategic options, the probability that they will 
seek out such information on their own and act upon it is remote.262 
Accordingly, a meaningful right of collective action requires 
employees to have enough information to exercise that right.263  
Despite this reality, the NLRB does almost nothing to ensure that 
employees are knowledgeable about their labor rights or options for 
exercising them.264 Instead, the Board has largely left the task of 
informing employees to private parties — primarily unions and 
 
 260 See Cass R. Sunstein, Deliberative Trouble?: Why Groups Go to Extremes, 110 
YALE L.J. 71, 105-06 (2000) (arguing that, to avoid excessive polarity in decision-
making, groups should be able to deliberate among themselves and not be isolated 
from opposing views); infra notes 290-91 and accompanying text. 
 261 See supra note 175. 
 262 This is especially true of nonunion collective action. See infra Part III.C.2. 
 263 See Barenberg, supra note 3, at 793-97 (noting that employee free choice 
depends on ability to deliberate over relevant information, including disparate 
viewpoints). 
 264 There are a few, limited exceptions to the NLRB’s refusal to inform employees. 
See infra note 284. 
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employers — while at most prohibiting statements that appear 
threatening or coercive.265 The NLRA does not require this abdication; 
it is silent on the issue of information and, therefore, provides the 
Board with considerable latitude to ensure proactively that employees 
are well informed.266 Refusing to take advantage of this opportunity is 
unfortunate because a lack of information hinders employee collective 
action and makes the NLRB less relevant, especially in an economy 
where there is a dearth of unions to inform employees about their 
labor rights.267 One notable exception to this failure arose in a recent, 
controversial NLRB decision. This exception was a limited advance, 
but it is worth considering as a model for future attempts to expand 
employees’ access to information. 
1. The Dana Corp. Notice 
This modest expansion of employee access to information occurred 
in the NLRB’s Dana Corp. decision.268 Dana Corp. was part of what 
union interests refer to as the 2007 “September Massacre,” in which 
the Bush Board reversed numerous precedents — some of which were 
decades old — to favor employer interests.269 At issue in Dana Corp. 
was employees’ ability to question a voluntarily recognized union’s 
majority support.270 In particular, the NLRB reconsidered its policy of 
providing a “voluntary-recognition bar” against decertification efforts. 
Although this issue was not directly related to information 
transference, the NLRB’s creation of a new notice requirement raised 
interesting questions about how the agency should regulate 
employees’ access to information. 
When the NLRB certifies employees’ vote for a union in an official 
election, the union generally enjoys one year of an irrebuttable 
 
 265 See 29 U.S.C. § 158(c) (2006); NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 617-
18 (1969). 
 266 See infra notes 292-94, 314-18 and accompanying text (providing options for 
information transference). 
 267 See supra note 62. 
 268 351 N.L.R.B. 434 (2007). 
 269 There was a rush to issue these decisions in September 2007 because the Board 
was scheduled to lose several members to expiring terms. See ANNE MARIE LOFASO, AM. 
CONSTITUTION SOC’Y, SEPTEMBER MASSACRE: THE LATEST BATTLE IN THE WAR ON 
WORKERS’ RIGHTS UNDER THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT 2 (May 14, 2008), 
http://www.acslaw.org/files/ACS%20September%20Massacre.pdf. 
 270 Without majority support, a union is barred from acting as the employees’ 
exclusive collective-bargaining representative. 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (2006); Int’l Ladies’ 
Garment Workers Union (Bernhard-Altmann Tex. Corp.) v. NLRB, 366 U.S. 731, 738-
39 (1961). 
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presumption of majority support.271 During this agency-created 
“certification bar” period, neither the employer nor employees can 
attempt to oust the union, even if there is solid evidence that a 
majority of employees no longer want it. After this year of protection, 
however, employers and employees can rebut the presumption of 
majority support under certain scenarios.272 
The certification bar is justified by several policy concerns, 
including the need to give the union time to bargain without facing 
pressure to produce “hot-house results” and to reduce an employer’s 
incentive to delay negotiations in the hope that the union’s support 
will erode.273 The NLRB had long recognized that these policy 
concerns also apply to situations in which an employer voluntarily 
recognized a union.274 Thus, the Board maintained a voluntary 
recognition bar that strongly resembled the certification bar, except 
for a shorter, six-month period of protection.275 
 
 271 Brooks v. NLRB, 348 U.S. 96, 98, 104 (1954) (approving Board rule that 
certification, “based on a Board-conducted election, must be honored for a ‘reasonable’ 
period, ordinarily ‘one year,’ in the absence of ‘unusual circumstances’ ”). “Unusual 
circumstances” that can shorten the one-year time period can occur where: “(1) the 
certified union dissolved or became defunct; (2) as a result of a schism, substantially 
all the members of officers of the certified union transferred their affiliation to a new 
local or international; (3) the size of the bargaining unit fluctuated radically within a 
short time.” Id. at 98-99.  
 272 Employees trying to get rid of a union must use the decertification process; 
employers with evidence of a loss of majority support can seek a decertification 
election, unilaterally withdraw recognition of the union, or under certain conditions 
conduct a poll. 29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(1)(A)(ii) (2006) (requiring expressed interest of at 
least 30% of employees for decertification election petition); Levitz Furniture Co. of 
the Pac. Inc., 333 N.L.R.B. 717, 717 (2001) (allowing employer to withdraw 
recognition based on showing that union in fact lost majority support, to file petition 
for election based on good-faith “reasonable uncertainty” as to union’s majority 
support, and to conduct poll with certain safeguards based on good faith reasonable 
doubt about union’s majority support). 
 273 Brooks, 348 U.S. at 99-100 (noting also need to hold employees responsible for 
their vote, decrease frequency of union raiding, and promote stable labor-management 
relations); Dana Corp., 351 N.L.R.B. 434, 446 (2007) (Members Liebman and Walsh, 
dissenting). Union “raiding” refers to one union trying to replace another as a group 
of employees’ collective-bargaining representative. Kye Pawlenko, Reevaluating Inter-
Union Competition: A Proposal to Resurrect Rival Unionism, 8 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 
651, 656 (2006) (arguing that increased competition among unions will increase 
union membership). 
 274 Keller Plastics E., Inc., 157 N.L.R.B. 583, 587 (1966) (stressing, in particular, 
need for “reasonable time to bargain”). 
 275 Sound Contractors, 162 N.L.R.B. 364, 366 (1996); Keller Plastics, 157 N.L.R.B. 
at 587. Although usually around six months, a “reasonable time” for the voluntary 
recognition bar can vary depending on the amount of time parties have bargained and 
how the bargaining process has developed. Royal Coach Lines, 282 N.L.R.B. 1037, 
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In Dana Corp., the NLRB ostensibly maintained the six-month 
voluntary recognition bar.276 However, it carved out a new forty-five-
day period immediately following voluntary recognition,277 during 
which a group of 30% or more employees can petition the NLRB for a 
decertification election to oust the union.278 This new rule was 
explicitly intended to discourage voluntary recognition in favor of 
Board-run elections,279 and it will easily satisfy that aim, as it will often 
make voluntary recognition ineffective where a union lacks support 
from at least 70% of employees.280 
Critics of Dana Corp.’s new forty-five-day window described it as an 
unjustified affront to voluntary recognition, which had been permitted 
under the NLRA since its enactment.281 But more relevant to the issue 
of information transference is the NLRB’s enforcement mechanism for 
its new rule. Under Dana Corp., the union will enjoy a voluntary 
recognition bar only after employees receive notice of their right to file 
a decertification petition during the forty-five-day window and that 
period has passed without such a petition.282 The NLRB was specific 
about the notice’s implementation: after voluntarily recognizing a 
union, an employer must notify the Board, which will then provide 
 
1038 (1987), enforcement denied on other grounds, 838 F.2d 47 (2d Cir. 1988). 
 276 351 N.L.R.B. at 435. 
 277 Id. 
 278 Id. at 443. The employees can alternatively petition for an election to select a 
different union as their collective-bargaining representative. Id. at 436. This window 
applies only to employee decertification, not to employer attempts to expel the union. 
See supra note 272. 
 279 351 N.L.R.B. at 438 (stating that “freedom of choice guaranteed employees by 
Section 7 is better realized by a secret election than a card check”). 
 280 Because only 30% of employees can force an election, even a union confident of 
maintaining majority support may initially seek an NLRB election if that support is 
less than 70%; an election will be faster than getting voluntarily recognized by the 
employer and then winning a subsequent decertification election. Dana Corp., 351 
N.L.R.B. at 444, 447-48 (Members Liebman and Walsh, dissenting); LOFASO, supra 
note 269, at 13. 
 281 Dana Corp., 351 N.L.R.B. at 445 (Members Liebman and Walsh, dissenting); 
The National Labor Relations Board: Recent Decisions and Their Impact on Workers’ 
Rights, supra note 215, at 4-6, 8-12 (quoting testimony and questions critical of Dana 
Corp.); Corbett, supra note 166, at 256; Raja Raghunath, Stacking the Deck: Privileging 
“Employer Free Choice” Over Industrial Democracy in the Card-Check Debate, 87 NEB. L. 
REV. 329, 366-67 (2008); see also Fisk & Malamud, supra note 3, at 2062-63 
(criticizing majority and dissent for failing to support arguments with empirical 
evidence). 
 282 351 N.L.R.B. at 441. 
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detailed notices informing employees of their right to seek 
decertification during the forty-five-day window.283  
At first blush, this notice requirement seems innocuous. However, 
the NLRB’s motivation for the notice was also criticized because it was 
the first time that the Board had ever imposed a general, affirmative 
duty to provide employees with information about their labor rights.284 
The Board has never formally sought to inform employees of their 
right to join a union or otherwise engage in collective action; rather, 
its first foray into the world of nonremedial notification focused solely 
on employees’ right to get rid of a union.285 
2. Informing Union Employees 
A future NLRB is likely to reverse Dana Corp. as well as the notice 
requirement.286 But why not keep the notification? Why not inform 
employees that they can force out a union after six months287 or after a 
year if there was an election? This is an important right that 
employees should understand when choosing whether to seek union 
 
 283 Id. at 443 (providing what is now basic text of notice). 
 284 Bodie, supra note 186, at 22 (citing Fla. Mining & Materials Corp., 198 N.L.R.B. 
601, 603 (1972), enforced, 481 F.2d 65 (5th Cir. 1973) (rejecting employer argument 
for affirmative duty on union to reveal information about being placed in 
trusteeship)). The NLRB’s only other general information requirements are: 1) after an 
election is ordered, employers must provide unions with employees’ names and home 
addresses, Excelsior Underwear, Inc., 156 N.L.R.B. 1236, 1239-40 (1966); and 2) 
employers must post copies of the NLRB’s Notice of Election, which notifies workers of 
balloting details, for at least three days before the election. Notice of Election, § 11314, 
NAT’L LAB. REL. BD., Aug. 2007, available at http://www.nlrb.gov/nlrb/legal/manuals/ 
CHMII/Sections11300-11350.pdf. The NLRB also requires posting of notices to inform 
employees of unfair labor practice findings at a specific workplace. See Guard Publ’g 
Co. (Register-Guard), 351 N.L.R.B. 1110, 1121, 1132 (Appendix) (2007), enforcement 
denied on other grounds, 571 F.3d 53 (D.C. Cir. 2009). 
 285 LOFASO, supra note 269, at 13; cf. Epilepsy Found., 331 N.L.R.B. 676, 684 
(2002) (Member Hurtgen, dissenting) (expressing concern that nonunionized 
employers will be unaware of their right to deal with employees individually if 
employees can demand coworker to accompany them in investigatory interview, but 
not expressing concern with nonunion employees being unaware of their rights), 
enforced in relevant part, 268 F.3d 1095 (D.C. Cir. 2001), overruled by IBM Corp., 341 
N.L.R.B. 1288 (2004). 
 286 See Notice and Invitation to File Briefs, NAT’L LAB. REL. BOARD (Aug. 31, 2010), 
available at http://www.nlrb.gov/sites/default/files/documents/236/rite-aid_lamons-
gasket_notice_conf.pdf (inviting briefs for NLRB’s reconsideration of Dana Corp. in 
forthcoming case, Lamons Gasket Co., 355 N.L.R.B. No. 157 (2010)); Dana Corp., 351 
N.L.R.B. at 434. 
 287 The six-month period refers to the pre-Dana Corp. voluntary-recognition bar. 
See supra notes 275-77. 
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representation. In addition, this information could help unions in 
some instances because employees might be more willing to vote for a 
union that they can oust after developing buyer’s remorse. 
Further, why not expand the notice requirement? Employees should 
be aware of their broad right to seek collective representation without 
interference from employers.288 If a union is already on the scene, it 
can provide that message, but a government notice would have more 
credence than biased union information.289 Moreover, there may never 
be a union presence at the workplace if employees are too uninformed 
or scared to investigate unionization in the first instance. 
The NLRB or Congress could also mandate the transference of a 
wider range of information than is contained in a general notice. For 
instance, once an organizing campaign has begun, employees still lack 
many pieces of relevant information about unionization. As Professor 
Matthew Bodie has shown, relying on the union and employer to 
provide information fails to give employees a complete picture.290 
Details about the union’s effectiveness in representing employees 
during workplace disputes, the kind of contract — if any — it will be 
able to negotiate with the employer, and other aspects of the 
collective-representation process are often lacking in an organizing 
campaign.291 
It is impossible to provide employees with the totality of relevant 
information, yet many improvements over the current system are 
available. The Department of Labor, for example, collects financial and 
other information from unions, but it does not make that information 
readily available to employees.292 The NLRB could post summaries of 
 
 288 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (2006). 
 289 See infra notes 317-18 and accompanying text (discussing potential problems 
with notice postings). “Union employees” is used in this section — in contrast to 
“nonunion employees” in the next — to refer to employees in a workplace with a 
union presence, including a workplace that is the target of an organizing campaign. 
 290 Bodie, supra note 186, at 50-69 (citing information problems caused by 
incentives for both unions and employers to overstate negative aspects of other, 
information asymmetries resulting from difficulty in observing and predicting quality 
of union services, lack of competition among unions, absence of third-party sources of 
information, difficulty in ending union representation, lack of rules against 
misrepresentations, and lack of public confidence in NLRB’s election procedure). 
 291 Id. at 50-51. 
 292 This information is required under the Labor-Management Reporting and 
Disclosure Act, 29 U.S.C. § 431 (2006). The Department of Labor posts the 
information on its website, but there is no requirement that employees be made aware 
of its existence. Bodie, supra note 186, at 60-61 (noting problems with method of 
information collection); Office of Labor-Management Standards, Union Reports, Other 
Reports, and Collective Bargaining Agreements, U.S. DEP’T OF LAB., available at 
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this information in appropriate workplaces and provide access to the 
full documents via the Internet; alternatively, it could require unions 
to provide such information to employees they are trying to organize. 
The NLRB could also pursue one of these options to make available 
relevant employer financial data, especially because employers — 
particularly privately held firms — are largely immune from having to 
release information useful to employees.293 Further, the Board could 
require the employer and union to report on the basic terms and 
conditions of their collective-bargaining agreements with other 
parties.294 Although these steps would not provide “full information” 
in the economic sense,295 they would enhance employees’ ability to 
make reasoned judgments about the potential costs and benefits of 
collective representation. 
3. Informing Nonunion Employees 
Although important in union settings, access to information is a far 
greater need for nonunion employees.296 Workplaces with a union 
presence at least have one source of information about employees’ 
 
www.unionreports.gov (last updated Sept. 16, 2010). 
 293 Alan Story, Employer Speech, Union Representation Elections, and the First 
Amendment, 16 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 356, 394 (1995). Publicly held companies 
must make public their financial data; however, that data is indecipherable to most 
employees. Michael R. Seibecker, Trust & Transparency: Promoting Efficient Corporate 
Disclosure Through Fiduciary-Based Discourse, 87 WASH. U. L. REV. 115, 128-36 (2009) 
(discussing problems with corporate disclosures). There is no such requirement for 
privately held firms. The NLRB currently requires an employer to provide a union 
already established as the employees’ representative with certain financial data if the 
employer claims that economic conditions make it impossible to meet the union’s 
demands. NLRB v. Truitt Mfg. Co., 351 U.S. 149, 152 (1956). 
 294 The Department of Labor makes public some collective-bargaining agreements. 
See supra note 292. But there is no attempt to ensure that employees are made aware 
of and have access to agreements involving their employer or a pertinent union. 
Moreover, a summary of basic terms will be far more useful to employees than the 
often complex language of a full agreement. 
 295 Bodie, supra note 186, at 70-72 (noting problems with mandatory disclosure 
regime, including identifying what type of information to disclose and what entities to 
include under mandate, creating incentives to avoid NLRB-election process, and 
“information overload”); Anne Marie Lofaso, Towards a Foundational Theory of 
Workers’ Rights: The Autonomous Dignified Worker, 76 UMKC L. REV. 1, 63 (2007).  
 296 Estlund, Towards Workplace Transparency, supra note 17, at 20 (stressing 
advantage of unionized employees of nonunionized employees in obtaining 
information about working conditions); Michael H. Gottesman, In Despair, Starting 
Over: Imagining a Labor Law for Unorganized Workers, 69 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 59, 76-77 
(1993). 
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labor rights. That source may be suboptimal,297 but it is far better than 
the information void that typically exists in the absence of a union. 
This reality has helped to sustain one of the best-kept secrets of 
labor law: that the NLRA and other labor statutes also protect 
nonunion employees.298 Although no data exist on nonunion 
employees’ knowledge of their labor rights, it is safe to assume that 
most are completely unaware of their right to engage in collective 
action.299 A rudimentary analysis of the NLRB’s intake data supports 
the notion that the NLRA is little known outside of the union context. 
For instance, in Fiscal Year 2009, over 16,000 allegations of employer 
unfair labor practices were filed with the Board.300 Of these charges, 
only 2615 (i.e., 15.8%) did not make allegations that clearly involved a 
labor organization of some kind,301 and the actual number of 
nonunion cases is much smaller because many of these charges still 
had a union on the scene.302 Indeed, a search of NLRB decisions 
during the same period found only 4 out of 347 (i.e., 1.2%) unfair 
labor practice cases that did not identify a union.303 Although the exact 
number is unclear, these data show that a large majority of charges 
filed with the NLRB involve employees proximate to a union.304 
Despite the predominance of union-related cases at the NLRB, many 
important workplace disputes implicate nonunion collective rights. 
Employee attempts to obtain a safer work environment, to talk about 
 
 297 See supra note 290. 
 298 See infra note 305. 
 299 This observation is based largely on the author’s experiences as a labor attorney 
and academic, which has included exposure to many employees, and even attorneys, 
who are oblivious to labor law’s role in the nonunion workplace. 
 300 74 NLRB ANN. REPORT 1, 94 (2010) (noting 16,541 charges). 
 301 This figure was based on cases involving only Section 8(a)(1) and Section 
8(a)(4) charges. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (2006) (prohibiting interference with 
employees’ Section 7 rights), (a)(4) (prohibiting retaliation against filing NLRA 
charges or testifying). The other unfair labor practices involve an employer’s unlawful 
support for a labor organization, id. § 158(a)(2); discrimination based on union 
activity or membership, id. § 158(a)(3); and an employer’s failure to bargain in good 
faith with employees’ collective-bargaining representative, id. § 158(a)(5). 
 302 A typical situation giving rise to such charges is the initial stage of a union 
campaign. See, e.g., Cmty. Med. Ctr., 354 N.L.R.B. No. 26 (2009) (finding Section 
8(a)(1) violation based on charge filed by union). 
 303 This includes both administrative law judge and NLRB decisions over that 
period. These searches probably underestimate the number of nonunion filings, as 
unrepresented employees are more likely to file unmeritorious charges. 
 304 The disparity is even greater if unfair labor practice charges against unions are 
included. In that instance, the total number of charges is 22,908, with 2,615 (11.4%) 
charges clearly not involving unions. 74 NLRB ANNUAL REPORT: FISCAL YEAR 2009, at 
94 (2010). 
  
1148 University of California, Davis [Vol. 44:1091 
each others’ pay and terms of employment, and to discuss conditions 
at work are but a few of the many actions protected solely by labor 
law.305 However, nonunion employees’ ignorance of these protections 
means that their labor rights are underenforced. Indeed, the lack of 
knowledge appears so severe that it may effectively eliminate those 
rights for most workers.306 
One major cause of this information gap is the NLRA’s enforcement 
process. The NLRB, like other labor agencies, is reactive; it does not 
investigate potential unfair labor practices unless someone files a 
charge.307 Yet, if employees are unaware of their labor rights, a charge 
will never materialize. This, along with the low union density in the 
United States, means that labor rights are largely illusory for the vast 
majority of employees.308 
One optimistic take on this information gap is that there is a lot of 
unmet potential. It is true that the exclusive administrative 
enforcement of the NLRA eliminates a private right of action that 
would bring more attention and litigation resources to nonunion labor 
rights.309 However, if more nonunion employees were aware of their 
rights, administrative enforcement promises real gains. Unlike most 
attorneys, agencies such as the NLRB are willing to pursue cases even 
where there is little to no money at stake.310 This contrasts with 
employment laws that rely primarily on private enforcement, which 
have been undermined by many employees’ inability to obtain 
representation.311 Thus, if nonunion employees were made aware of 
the NLRA, they could see dramatic improvements in their ability to 
enforce at least some of their workplace rights. 
Whether it is possible to close the nonunion information gap is a 
different question. The NLRB could pursue an extensive public 
 
 305 See, e.g. NLRB v. Wash. Aluminum Co., 370 U.S. 9, 12 (1962) (noting 
nonunion employees leaving work because of extreme cold in plant); Leonard 
Bierman & Rafael Gely, Love, Sex and Politics? Sure. Salary? No Way: Workplace Social 
Norms and the Law, 25 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 167 (2004) (describing NLRA 
protections for employees discussing pay). 
 306 See supra note 63. 
 307 29 U.S.C. § 160(b) (2006). 
 308 See supra note 62. 
 309 See James J. Brudney, Isolated and Politicized: The NLRB’s Uncertain Future, 26 
COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 221, 231-33 (2005). 
 310 See Grouse Mountain Assocs., 333 N.L.R.B. 1322, 1327 (2001), enforced, 56 
Fed. App’x 811 (9th Cir. 2003). 
 311 This problem is particularly severe for low-wage employees. Deborah L. Brake 
& Joanna L. Grossman, The Failure of Title VII as a Rights-Claiming System, 86 N.C. L. 
REV. 859, 879-84 (2008) (discussing barriers to enforcing employment discrimination 
rights). 
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relations strategy or conduct workplace inspections, but the lack of 
resources is an obvious hurdle. The Board has long struggled to 
maintain its enforcement duties under budget constraints that, at 
times, have been severe.312 Thus, spending time and money to broaden 
its exposure or enforcement capabilities may be a luxury that the 
NLRB cannot afford. Seeking additional funding for these efforts may 
be worth the trouble, however. Given that 92% of private sector 
employees are nonunion, the NLRB’s own relevance depends in part 
on serving their interests.313 Additionally, the continued failure to 
inform nonunion employees of their labor rights makes the NLRA a 
mere shadow of what Congress intended. 
Barring any substantial increase in funding, is there anything that 
the NLRB can do? Implementing mandatory disclosure rules on 
employers and unions is one option, but it would have a limited reach 
in the nonunion sector.314 A different, and relatively inexpensive, 
strategy would be to expand the use of notice postings like the one in 
Dana Corp., as well as electronic notices where appropriate.315 The 
Board itself — just prior to this Article going to print — proposed a 
rule that would do just that. Under the rule, all firms covered by the 
NLRA would have to post official notices that would inform 
employees of most of their rights under the NLRA.316 
One problem with notices, however, is that their effectiveness may 
be limited. In particular, there is a risk of information overload, which 
occurs when a multitude of notices drown each other out.317 Although 
 
 312 Michael J. Goldberg, Inside Baseball at the NLRB: Chairman Gould and His 
Critics, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1045, 1064 (2002) (reviewing WILLIAM B. GOULD IV, LABORED 
RELATIONS: LAW, POLITICS, AND THE NLRB (2000)). Moreover, if the NLRB is successful 
in making nonunion employees aware of the NLRA’s applicability, there will be 
further strain on the agency’s enforcement capabilities.  
 313 See supra note 62. 
 314 See supra notes 292-95 and accompanying text. 
 315 See supra note 283. There have been unsuccessful attempts to require such a 
notice. AFL-CIO General Counsel Urges NLRB to Require Notices Describing NLRA 
Rights, 192 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) at A-10 (Oct. 3, 2003). Moreover, the Department 
of Labor has recently issued a proposed rule to require federal contractors to post 
NLRA-rights notices. Notification of Employee Rights Under Federal Labor Laws, 74 
Fed. Reg. 38,488, 38,488 (Aug. 3, 2009). 
 316 NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, PROPOSED RULES GOVERNING NOTIFICATION OF 
EMPLOYEE RIGHTS UNDER THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT, 29 C.F.R. pt. 104 at 8-9, 
37-40 (2010) (describing notice that informs employees of most of their NLRA rights, 
while excluding employees’ right to object to portions of their dues to go to activity 
unrelated to the union’s representation which, as the proposal notes, unions must 
already provide such notice to covered employees).  
 317 See Matthew A. Edwards, Empirical and Behavioral Critiques of Mandatory 
Disclosure: Socio-Economics and the Quest for Truth in Lending, 14 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. 
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there are already several mandatory workplace notices, information 
overload is unlikely to be a serious issue for a new NLRB notice.318 
This is because the labor information gap is so great that narrowing it 
is an easy target. For most employees, a simple notice providing 
general information about their labor rights and, most importantly, 
identifying the NLRB as a point of contact would be a dramatic 
improvement over the status quo. Even if employees do not absorb 
specific details, an NLRB notice would serve an important function by 
providing a general awareness of labor rights. Moreover, many 
employees will look more carefully at a board of notices when they 
have a workplace problem. Those employees currently see nothing 
about their right to engage in collective action. Therefore, establishing 
an NLRB presence on that board would give the agency a much greater 
opportunity to protect the labor rights of a large and previously 
overlooked group of employees. 
Notice postings are no panacea, but their potential benefit illustrates 
the magnitude of the current labor information gap. Whether a future 
attempt to address this issue focuses on notices as opposed to other 
strategies is far less important than the existence of the attempt itself. 
Any reform is likely to achieve a dramatic improvement in employees’ 
knowledge and enjoyment of their labor rights, especially in the 
nonunion sector. That improvement, in turn, would help revive the 
NLRB, as its relevance would no longer be limited to a shrinking 
population of employees. 
CONCLUSION 
Employee discourse is a vitally important, yet neglected, part of 
labor law. Despite its recognition in the early days of the NLRA as a 
necessary element of collective action, employees’ right to 
communicate and access information has repeatedly taken a backseat 
to other considerations. Indeed, in many instances, it would be an 
exaggeration to say that the NLRB and courts are even giving lip 
 
POL’Y 199, 221-23 (2005); Troy A. Paredes, Blinded by the Light: Information Overload 
and Its Consequences for Securities Regulation, 81 WASH. U. L.Q. 417, 444-49 (2003). 
But see Alan Schwartz & Louis L. Wilde, Intervening in Markets on the Basis of 
Imperfect Information: A Legal and Economic Analysis, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 630, 675-76 
(1979) (arguing that information overload is often not serious problem). 
 318 The Department of Labor requires posters — including ones addressing safety 
and health, discrimination, wage and hour protections, family and medical leave, 
disabilities, military service discrimination, use of polygraphs, and agricultural 
workers — that are available at: http://www.dol.gov/oasam/programs/osdbu/sbrefa/ 
poster/matrix.htm. 
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service to the important role that discourse plays in promoting 
employees’ labor rights.319 
This neglect directly conflicts with the fundamental mechanics of 
collective action. Public choice theory, as well as relevant game theory 
analyses, has reasoned that many of the barriers to collective action 
can be overcome through information, discourse, and coordination. 
Psychological research has bolstered these theoretical arguments. 
Studies consistently demonstrate that a significant degree of 
information and interpersonal interaction is needed for individuals to 
self-identify as a group and ultimately act together to further the 
group’s interests. The totality of this theoretical and psychological 
research strongly supports the original policies of the NLRA, which 
stressed the need to protect employee discourse as a means to foster 
collective action.320 
Appreciation for this linkage between discourse and collective 
action has been lost in the ensuing years. Often mentioned, but rarely 
respected, employee discourse has become a second-class citizen in 
the world of labor law. Even when a case directly implicates employee 
communications, the NLRB and courts consistently misconstrue or 
disregard the difference between superficial contact and true 
discourse. This disconnect severely undermines employees’ labor 
rights, for without discourse there is no collective action. 
Several high-profile labor law issues illustrate the consequences of 
discounting employee discourse.321 For instance, the regulation of 
workplace discourse has become so far adrift that the NLRB now views 
e-mail as an affront to employer interests, rather than a low-cost, 
effective means for employees to exercise their right to collective 
action.322 Similarly, attempts to reform the current representation 
process threaten to undermine their own goals by ignoring the 
significance of discourse.323 These proposals would likely improve 
employees’ ability to unionize, but only by diminishing their 
opportunity to learn about and discuss options for collective 
representation.324 Alternate reforms that made the role of employee 
discourse more prominent could provide similar benefits at a lower cost. 
Finally, the failure to give employee discourse its due has 
maintained a significant gap in employees’ knowledge of their labor 
 
 319 See supra notes 51-53 and accompanying text. 
 320 See supra Part I. 
 321 See supra Part III. 
 322 See supra Part III.A.3. 
 323 See supra Part III.B. 
 324 See supra Part III.B.1-2. 
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rights and options for exercising those rights. Because employees 
cannot take advantage of something that they do not know exists, any 
reform effort — particularly one targeting nonunion employees — will 
have a limited effect as long as that gap persists.325 Yet, information 
alone is not enough. To have a genuine opportunity to act together, 
employees must also have the ability to discuss that information 
among themselves. Thus, if labor law is to achieve its stated goals, it 
must promote the twin pillars of information and discourse. Without 
such support, the promise of collective action will remain, for many 
employees, nothing but a mirage. 
 
 325 See supra Part III.C. 
